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The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the 
Chief Executive 
Amandeep S. Grewal† 
  INTRODUCTION   
The 2016 presidential election brought widespread atten-
tion to a part of the Constitution, the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, that had previously enjoyed a peaceful spot in the dust-
bin of history.1 The clause requires that persons “holding any 
Office of Profit or Trust under the United States” (“U.S. Offic-
ers”) obtain consent from Congress prior to accepting gifts, of-
fices, titles, or emoluments from a foreign government.2 Though 
the clause could apply broadly, Congress has preempted many 
questions through the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, which 
generally blesses the acceptance of small gifts.3 Consequently, 
the clause has created few significant controversies during our 
nation’s history. 
However, Donald Trump’s successful election has ignited 
public and scholarly interest in the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
 
†. Professor and Joseph F. Rosenfield Scholar, University of Iowa College 
of Law. Copyright © 2017 by Amandeep S. Grewal. 
 1. Kimberly Robinson, Five Things You Didn’t Know About the Emolu-
ments Clause, BLOOMBERG L.: BIG L. BUS. (Dec. 1, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/ 
five-things-you-didnt-know-about-the-emoluments-clause. 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 3. See 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (2012); see also 10 U.S.C. § 1060 (granting consent, 
under specified procedures, to a retired military member ’s employment with the 
military forces of a newly democratic nation, and consenting to the compensa-
tion associated with his employment, office, or position); 37 U.S.C. § 908 (provid-
ing congressional consent to retired military members’ civilian employment 
with foreign governments, if some procedural requirements are satisfied); Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, 
§ 3504, 107 Stat. 1965–66 (1993) (granting consent, under specified procedures, 
to non-citizen Panama Canal Commission employees’ acceptance of civil em-
ployment with the Government of Panama). 
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and, specifically, the meaning of the term “emolument.”4 Some 
commentators, including former Ambassador Norm Eisen, Pro-
fessor Richard Painter, and Professor Laurence Tribe, have ad-
vocated a broad interpretation of that term, such that it includes 
essentially any payment or benefit.5 Under their framework, 
President Trump qualifies as a U.S. Officer and the activities of 
his business enterprise, the Trump Organization, establish For-
eign Emoluments Clause violations from “day one.”6 The Trump 
Organization caters to customers globally, and payments or 
other benefits from foreign governments surely arise in the ordi-
nary course of its activities.7 
As one illustration of the problem, the commentators point 
to the Trump Hotel in Washington D.C. That hotel’s customers 
include representatives of foreign governments, and if the com-
mentators’ approach holds, any lodging or other fees paid by 
 
 4. See, e.g., Olivia B. Waxman, What Is an Emolument? Donald Trump 
Has People Talking About This Part of the Constitution, TIME (Nov. 22, 2016) 
http://time.com/4579979/emoluments-clause-constitution-donald-trump. Dur-
ing the 2016 election season, some argued that Hillary Clinton violated the For-
eign Emoluments Clause during her tenure as the Secretary of State, though 
those arguments largely failed to gain traction. See Jonathan H. Adler, Is the 
Emoluments Clause a Problem for Hillary Clinton?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh 
-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/23/is-the-emoluments-clause-a-problem-for-hillary 
-clinton (describing two professors’ competing views on the issue). 
 5. See NORMAN EISEN, RICHARD PAINTER & LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOVERN-
ANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: ITS TEXT, MEANING, 
AND APPLICATION TO DONALD J. TRUMP 11 (2016) [hereinafter BROOKINGS RE-
PORT], http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_ 
emoluments-clause1.pdf (“[T]he Clause unquestionably reaches any situation in 
which a federal officeholder receives money, items of value, or services from a 
foreign state.”). The authors apparently exempt payments related to some un-
profitable transactions from their definition, though it is not clear which ones. 
Compare id. at 11 (stating that the clause “covers even ordinary, fair market 
value transactions that result in any economic profit or benefit to the federal 
officeholder,” which implies an exception for unprofitable transactions), with id. 
at 18 (stating that “[w]holly apart from any actual quid pro quo arrangements 
. . . the Emoluments Clause will be violated whenever a foreign diplomat stays 
in a Trump hotel or hosts a reception in one,” but apparently making no allow-
ance for the possibility that rental transactions may result in loss, after taking 
into account properly allocable depreciation, lease payments, carrying charges, 
and so on). It appears that the authors would not treat payments received in a 
sale of property as an emolument, where the property is sold for less than its 
cost to the U.S. Officer. 
 6. See id. at 10. 
 7. See Richard Paddock et al., Potential Conflicts Around the Globe for 
Trump, the Businessman President, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/us/politics/donald-trump-international-business 
.html. 
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those customers would reflect payments from a foreign govern-
ment to a U.S. Officer. Should President Trump fail to obtain 
congressional consent for these payments, the commentators ar-
gue, he will have violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause and 
the grounds for his impeachment will have been established.8 
This Article argues, however, that the commentators have 
interpreted the Foreign Emoluments Clause too broadly. By 
stating that an emolument refers to any payment, they rely on 
an expansive definition of the term9 that does not apply in this 
context. Under the proper definition of emolument,10 abbrevi-
ated here as “office-related compensation,” the term refers only 
 
 8. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 5, at 18 (“[T]he Emoluments Clause 
will be violated whenever a foreign diplomat stays in a Trump hotel.”); id. at 22 
(“[I]f Mr. Trump enters office in what would obviously constitute a knowing and 
indeed intentional violation of the Emoluments Clause and then declines to cure 
that violation during his tenure, Congress would be well within its rights to 
impeach him for engaging in ‘high crimes and misdemeanors.’”). 
 9. See id. at 11 (acknowledging the office-related definition of emoluments 
used by the Office of Legal Counsel but stating that “[t]he word also has an older 
meaning of ‘advantage, benefit, comfort,’” and arguing that in the 1790s, emol-
uments were “understood to encompass any conferral of a benefit or advantage, 
whether through money, objects, titles, offices, or economically valuable waivers 
or relaxations of otherwise applicable requirements”).  
 10. In applying the Foreign Emoluments Clause to a U.S. Officer, many 
legal authorities apply an office-related definition, which makes sense, given 
that “emolument” in the clause is grouped with positions under foreign law. See, 
e.g., Applicability of the Emoluments Clause & the Foreign Gifts & Decorations 
Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 2009 WL 6365082 (Dec. 
7, 2009) (forthcoming in 33 Op. O.L.C.) [hereinafter President’s Receipt] (illus-
trating a foreign government’s “conferral of [an] emolument” by referencing the 
“hiring [of ] an employee”); Applicability of 18 U.S.C. 219 to Retired Foreign 
Serv. Officers, 11 Op. O.L.C. 67, 67 n.2 (1987) (“The term ‘emolument’ has been 
interpreted to include compensation for employment.”) (citing Comp. of Emps. 
Detailed to Assist Foreign Gov’ts, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 513 (1947)); Sec’y of the Air 
Force, 49 Comp. Gen. 819, 820 (1970) (“‘Emolument’ is broadly defined as profit, 
gain, or compensation received for services rendered. . . . Reward monies re-
ceived for the service . . . to [foreign] public authorities would, in our opinion, 
fall within [the Foreign Emoluments Clause].”); Gordon, U.S. Coast Guard, 44 
Comp. Gen. 130, 130 (1964) (“[T]he term ‘emoluments’ is defined . . . as ‘the 
profit arising from office or employment’ and ‘that which is received as compen-
sation for services, or which is annexed to the possession of office as salary, fees, 
and perquisites.’”); Memorandum from J. Lee Rankin, Assistant Att’y Gen., Of-
fice of Legal Counsel, to S.A. Andretta, Admin. Assistant Att’y Gen. 8 (Oct. 4, 
1954) (on file with Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter Rankin Memo] (“[T]he 
term ‘emolument’ . . . was intended to cover compensation of any sort arising 
out of an employment relationship with a foreign state.”) (cited favorably in 
Emoluments Clause & World Bank, 25 Op. O.L.C. 113, 114 (2001) (also citing, 
for the same proposition, Application of Emoluments Clause to Part-Time Con-
sultant for the Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 10 Op. O.L.C. 96, 98 (1986))); see 
also infra Part I.B. Early versions of modern dictionaries usually list an office-
related definition as the principal definition. See, e.g., Emolument, A COMPLETE 
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to the compensation one receives for the personal performance of 
services, whether as an officer or employee.11 Under this defini-
tion, ordinary business transactions between foreign govern-
ments and the Trump Organization do not violate the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. Only transactions conducted at other than 
arm’s length12 or transactions involving the provision of services 
by the President personally establish potential violations. 
 
AND UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON A NEW PLAN (1774) (“[P]rofit arising 
from an office or employ.”); Emolument, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENG-
LISH LANGUAGE (1828) (“1. The profit arising from office or employment; that 
which is received as a compensation for services, or which is annexed to the 
possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites. 2. Profit; advantage; gains 
in general.”); Emolument, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCI-
PLES (1891) (“1. Profit or gain arising from station, office, or employment; dues; 
reward, remuneration, salary. 2. Advantage, benefit, comfort.”) (supporting 
principal definition with examples from 1480, 1650, 1743, 1803, and 1881, and 
supporting secondary definition with examples from 1633, 1704, and 1756). The 
secondary definition may very well have been the principal definition at one 
point—various eighteenth-century sources contemplate only a general defini-
tion of emolument. See, e.g., Emolument, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (1755) (“Profit; advantage.”); John Mikhail, “Emolument” in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, BALKINIZATION BLOG (May 28, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot 
.com/2017/05/emolument-in-blackstones-commentaries.html (arguing that Wil-
liam Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England contemplated a broad 
definition of emoluments). The Federalist Papers usually use emolument in an 
office-related sense. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. The current edi-
tion of the leading legal dictionary offers a single, office-related definition of 
emoluments. See Emolument, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014) (“Any 
advantage, profit, or gain received as a result of one’s employment or one’s hold-
ing of office.”). The first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary listed the office-re-
lated definition as the principal definition. See Emolument, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (1st ed. 1891) (“The profit arising from office or employment; that 
which is received as compensation for services, or which is annexed to the pos-
session of office as salary, fees, and perquisites; advantage; gain, public or pri-
vate. Webster. Any perquisite, advantage, profit, or gain arising from the pos-
session of office.”). Further analysis could reveal different shades to the 
principal and secondary definitions of emolument. See Robert G. Natelson, The 
Original Meaning of “Emoluments” in the Constitution, 52 GA. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2017) (on file with Minnesota Law Review) (describing four potential 
Ratification Era meanings of “emolument”). 
 11. See, e.g., Rankin Memo, supra note 10 (“[T]he term ‘emolument’ . . . was 
intended to cover compensation of any sort arising out of an employment rela-
tionship with a foreign state.”). Technically speaking, the services may be pro-
vided as either an officer, employee, or as an independent contractor. But for 
ease of exposition, this Article will use “officer or employee” or similar phrases 
to refer to all three statuses. 
 12. If a foreign government makes a payment to the Trump Organization 
in excess of the fair market value of the goods or services provided by it, the 
excess amount could potentially be characterized as a disguised payment to 
President Trump for services personally provided by him. See infra Part III.B. 
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Part I shows that numerous legal authorities support an of-
fice-related definition of emoluments under the Constitution, in-
cluding under the Foreign Emoluments Clause. The Executive 
and Legislative Branches have each followed the Supreme 
Court’s office-related definition13 when, as is the case with the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, emolument appears in relation to 
an office or officer.14 The office-related definition thus better fits 
the relevant context than the expansive definition. 
Putting aside definitional disputes, vexing questions arise 
when determining whether an emolument arises in a transac-
tion between a foreign government and a business entity owned 
or affiliated with a U.S. Officer. One can reasonably argue that 
payments to the entity, rather than to the U.S. Officer, are cate-
gorically exempt from the Foreign Emoluments Clause. How-
ever, Part II examines the limited authorities available and con-
cludes otherwise, proposing a three-part business entity test to 
help analyze the difficult problems in this area. 
The analysis in Parts I and II applies generally to U.S. Of-
ficers, but Part III turns to the sitting President. It argues that, 
under the framework presented here, any compensated transac-
tion involving the provision of services by President Trump per-
sonally to a foreign government would violate the Foreign Emol-
uments Clause. It also argues, using a market rate analysis, that 
ordinary business transactions between foreign governments 
and Trump Organization entities do not implicate the clause. 
But non-market rate transactions would raise questions related 
to the unconstitutional acceptance of gifts, emoluments, or 
bribes. 
These conclusions are necessarily general, given the absence 
of detailed public information regarding President Trump’s busi-
ness dealings. They may even become largely irrelevant if, as is 
promised, President Trump remains insulated from the Trump 
Organization’s activities. However, Part III should offer helpful 
guidance if President Trump becomes entangled in the activities 
of the Trump Organization or personally engages in commercial 
transactions with foreign governments. 
 
 13. See, e.g., Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. (1 How.) 109, 135 (1850) (“[T]he 
term emoluments . . . embrac[es] every species of compensation or pecuniary 
profit derived from a discharge of the duties of the office . . . .”). 
 14. See infra Part I.B. 
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I.  FOREIGN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: SCOPE & MEANING   
This Part examines the definition of emolument in the For-
eign Emoluments Clause. Section A first provides a brief back-
ground of the clause and describes a controversy over whether it 
applies to the President. Section B shows that an emolument un-
der the Foreign Emoluments Clause refers only to the compen-
sation that a U.S. Officer receives from providing services for a 
foreign government. Section C shows that the acceptance of that 
compensation would be constitutionally prohibited even if the 
services performed have nothing to do with the U.S. Officer’s of-
ficial government duties. 
A. HISTORY 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause, found in Article I, Section 
9, Clause 8 of the Constitution, provides that “no Person holding 
any Office of Profit or Trust” under the United States may accept 
“any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever” 
from a foreign government “without the Consent of Congress.”15 
The clause, through somewhat outmoded language, addresses 
specific types of benefits provided by a foreign government to a 
U.S. Officer. The Articles of Confederation contained a similar 
provision, though it lacked any references to congressional con-
sent.16 
The limited contemporary materials available suggest that 
the Framers included the Foreign Emoluments Clause to “pre-
vent corruption.”17 Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph, who 
 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 16. See Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 30, 33 (2012). Actual compliance with this provision may have been 
minimal. See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SAL-
ARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 79 (2013) (“Alt-
hough the Articles of Confederation in 1781 prohibited U.S. officers from accept-
ing presents from foreign states, this prohibition—like so many positive 
enactments regulating official income in this era—had no effect.”). 
 17. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 327 (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (1911) (statement of Edmund Randolph, Governor of 
Virginia); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 216 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) (stating that the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause “is founded in a just jealousy of foreign influence 
of every sort”). The Framers may have been prescient in this regard. See, e.g., 7 
CONG. REC. 1331 (1878) (statement of Sen. Aaron A. Sargent) (“Every sort of 
present, from every sort of foreign potentate, from an order of nobility to a 
cream-jug, from the Queen of England to a king of the Cannibal Islands, seems 
to be grasped for with avidity by our officers, naval, military, and consular and 
diplomatic.”). 
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attended the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, later jus-
tified the clause to his state’s ratifying convention, saying that a 
king had previously presented a snuff box to a U.S. ambassador, 
and that the transfer could have subjected the ambassador to 
improper “foreign influence.”18 Charles Pinckney, who proposed 
the addition of the clause in Philadelphia, broadly emphasized 
the “necessity of preserving foreign Ministers & other officers of 
the U.S. independent of external influence.”19 
Many words in the Foreign Emoluments Clause may be fa-
miliar to today’s readers, but the reference to an “Office of Profit 
or Trust” raises some interpretive questions. According to sec-
ondary sources, an office of profit historically referred to a sala-
ried office in which the holder had a proprietary interest, such 
that the office could be inherited or sold.20 An office of trust, by 
contrast, required “the exercise of discretion, judgment, experi-
ence and skill,”21 such that the office itself or its assigned duties 
could not be transferred. In a memorandum opinion to the White 
House, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) considered whether 
these references to profit and trust limited the types of offices 
covered by the clause and expressed doubt that they did, though 
it ultimately reserved judgment on the question.22 
Scholarly debates23 show that whether the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause treats the President as a U.S. Officer remains an 
open question.24 At first glance, it may seem implausible that 
 
 18. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 17. 
 19. Id. at 389. 
 20. See Application of the Emoluments Clause to a Member of the Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics, 29 Op. O.L.C. 55, 61 (2005) [hereinafter President’s 
Council] (citing various sources). 
 21. FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND 
OFFICERS 9 (1890) (as quoted in President’s Council, supra note 20); see also 
Office, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW (Frederick D. Linn & Co. 
1888) (1883) (“Public offices are either offices of trust, which cannot be per-
formed by deputy . . . or ministerial offices, which may be performed by dep-
uty.”). 
 22. See President’s Council, supra note 20, at 56 (“[W]e need not precisely 
define whether or to what extent the words ‘of Profit or Trust’ narrow the cate-
gory of offices governed by the Emoluments Clause.”). 
 23. For highly informative debates on the subject, see Zephyr Teachout, 
The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009); Teachout, supra 
note 16; Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor 
Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399 (2012); Seth Bar-
rett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: 
A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180 (2013) 
[hereinafter Tillman, Public Meaning]. 
 24. The OLC has taken inconsistent views on this issue. See Andy Grewal, 
What DOJ Opinions Say About Trump and the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
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the Constitution would exempt any member of the government 
from a provision designed to prevent corruption. Yet the Domes-
tic Emoluments Clause,25 which also guards against corrup-
tion,26 applies only to the President and not generally to U.S. 
Officers, or even to the Vice President.27 This suggests that the 
Framers may have drafted each emoluments clause to address 
their principal concerns, without attempting to guard against 
corruption of every type imaginable.28 
Regarding their principal concerns, the Framers may very 
well have believed that only appointed officers, like ambassa-
dors, would make the types of extended visits abroad that could 
subject them to improper foreign influences.29 The President, 
 
YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Dec. 7, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/ 
what-doj-opinions-say-about-trump-and-the-foreign-emoluments-clause (com-
paring President’s Receipt, supra note 10, (stating, without analysis, that the 
clause “surely” applies to the President), with President’s Council, supra note 
20, at 70–71 (stating that a “great majority” of OLC opinions “equated an ‘Office 
of Profit or Trust’ under the [Foreign] Emoluments Clause with an ‘officer of the 
United States’ under the Appointments Clause,” until a 1982 opinion expanded 
the scope to some subordinate employees)). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; see infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
This provision is more commonly referred to as the Presidential Compensation 
Clause, though given the orientation of this Article and recent public debates, 
it will be referred to as the Domestic Emoluments Clause. 
 26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
 28. See Natelson, supra note 10 (“The process of crafting the emoluments 
provisions was one of weighing values in competition with each other, compro-
mising, fine-tuning, and drafting a carefully nuanced text.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments 
Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 92–93 (2007) (“To the Founders, the proper exercise 
of such sovereign authority by officers abroad was critical for the security of the 
Nation. . . . [T]he [Foreign] Emoluments Clause . . . was adopted with particular 
reference to preventing foreign corruption of such officers.”); The Constitution-
ality of Coop. Int’l Law Enf ’t Activities Under the Emoluments Clause, 20 Op. 
O.L.C. 346, 348 (1996) (“The Emoluments Clause was intended to protect for-
eign ministers, ambassadors, and other officers of the United States from undue 
influence and corruption by foreign governments.”); see also PARRILLO, supra 
note 16, at 78–79 (describing the “larger practice of gift-giving that typified the 
culture of European diplomacy” and the U.S. diplomats who “partook of these 
rewards,” including Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Silas Deane); cf. H.R. 
REP. NO. 23-302, at 3 (1834) (reproducing Secretary of State John Quincy Ad-
ams’s instructions to the U.S. Ambassador to England, under which it was ex-
pected that presents “made to any public minister or other officer of this Gov-
ernment, abroad” would be declined); Joseph P. Creekmore, Acceptance of 
Foreign Employment by Retired Military Personnel, 43 MIL. L. REV. 111, 115 
(1969) (“[T]hroughout the first one hundred years of this nation’s existence it 
was considered that this prohibition [the Foreign Emoluments Clause] was de-
signed primarily to control the activities of our diplomatic officials . . . .”) (citing 
Marshal of Fla., 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 409 (1854); Foreign Diplomatic Comm’n, 
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they may have thought, would remain stateside to tend to the 
needs of the nation, and potential corruption would be best ad-
dressed through the Domestic Emoluments Clause.30 Under this 
view, the exclusion of the President from the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause would be entirely consistent with the Framers’ de-
sign. 
The Framers may also have considered the differences be-
tween the compensation schemes for the President and U.S. Of-
ficers. That is, through the Constitution, they guaranteed the 
President a fixed salary but left many U.S. Officers in a rela-
tively precarious position.31 Historically, many U.S. Officers re-
ceived no set compensation but instead made their living by 
charging individuals for specific transactions, like for processing 
immigration applications or for deciding veterans’ benefit 
claims.32 Other U.S. Officers relied on bounties and were paid 
only when they, for example, sunk enemy ships, caught tax evad-
ers, or successfully prosecuted criminals.33 Given these poten-
tially uncertain34 streams of income (that is, emoluments),35 the 
 
13 Op. Att’y Gen. 537 (1871); Gifts from Foreign Prince, 24 Op. Att’y Gen. 116 
(1902); FRANCIS WHARTON, A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 757 (1886)). 
 30. One might point out that many U.S. Officers would also remain state-
side and would not be subject to the Domestic Emoluments Clause. But this 
further establishes that neither of the emoluments clauses was designed to 
catch every improper influence related to emoluments. One could easily imagine 
circumstances where Congress attempts to influence the Secretary of Transpor-
tation, for example, by offering a higher salary for his post, yet the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause does not address this potentially problematic behavior. Cf. 
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 23, 51 (1995) (describing how the “congressional committee system 
exists as a rivalrous and potentially dual executive structure” to administrative 
agencies). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. II § 1, cl. 7 (granting the President a fixed compensa-
tion which cannot be reduced or increased by Congress). 
 32. See PARRILLO, supra note 16, at 1. 
 33. Id.  
 34. See id. at 12 (“Prior to the early nineteenth century, statutory interven-
tion in officer-recipient exchanges were limited. It was difficult to enumerate 
officers’ services and fix prices for them in advance. Services often were idiosyn-
cratic, required variable amounts of labor or speed . . . . And even if a service 
were long-standing, stable, and familiar to officers and recipients, the legisla-
ture might accidentally forget to include it [in the statutes allowing the collec-
tion of fees].”). 
 35. Various Supreme Court opinions use the term emolument to describe 
the sometimes idiosyncratic nature of an officer ’s compensation. For example, 
as described by the Court, in the case of an Army officer, his emoluments could 
include, aside from a salary, the provision of servants and forage for his horses. 
See McLean v. United States, 226 U.S. 374, 382 (1912) (“Pay and emoluments 
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Framers may have believed that U.S. Officers could be easily 
tempted by foreign payments and therefore may have included 
only them in the Foreign Emoluments Clause. However, no his-
torical materials advance this understanding. 
Given the exquisite uncertainty of the issues,36 the remain-
der of this Article will assume that the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause applies to the President. Even if this assumption proves 
 
are but expressions of value used to give complete recompense to a deserving 
officer. Their association was deliberate; emoluments were additive to pay. . . . 
Congress has granted them, and advisedly, knowing Major McLean’s situation, 
knowing that they included allowance for servants and forage for horses . . . .”). 
For the High Sheriff of Havana, her emoluments could include the legal right 
to slaughter cattle and receive compensation for the same. See O’Reilly De Ca-
mara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 48–49 (1908) (“The plaintiff is a Spanish subject 
and alleges a title by descent to the right to carry on the slaughter of cattle in 
the city of Havana and to receive compensation for the same. . . . According to 
the complaint the right was incident to an inheritable and alienable office; that 
of Alguacil Mayor or High Sheriff of Havana. The office was abolished in 1878, 
subject to provisions that continued the emoluments until the incumbent should 
be paid.”). For a federal court clerk, his emoluments could include a right to 
keep a portion of the filing fees received. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 123 U.S. 
681, 686 (1887) (“The clerk of a court of the United States collects . . . fees and 
emoluments of his office, with an obligation on his part to account to the United 
States for all he gets over a certain sum which is fixed by law.”). And for a tax 
collector, his emoluments could include the right to a share of any penalties paid 
or assets forfeited. See, e.g., Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. (1 How.) 109, 135 
(1850) (“The compensation of the collector was derived from three sources;—1. 
fees allowed for the services already referred to; 2. commissions on the duties 
received; and 3. a share of the fines, penalties, and forfeitures. The emoluments 
of the office were dependent upon the receipts from these sources; and the officer 
was entitled to apply to his own use the whole amount derived from them.”). 
 36. The two professors who have most extensively examined whether 
elected officials come within the Foreign Emoluments Clause, and who have 
come to opposite conclusions, agree that the issue is difficult. See Zephyr 
Teachout & Seth Barrett Tillman, Common Interpretation—The Foreign Emol-
uments Clause: Article I, Section 9, Clause 8, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: INTERACTIVE 
CONST., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/articles/article-i/ 
the-foreign-emoluments-clause-article-i-section-9-clause-8/clause/34 (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2017) (stating that whether the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
“reaches any or all federal elected positions—i.e., Representative, Senator, Vice 
President, President, and presidential elector—poses a difficult interpretive 
challenge”); see also William Baude, Constitutional Officers: A Very Close Read-
ing, JOTWELL (July 28, 2016), http://conlaw.jotwell.com/constitutional-officers 
-a-very-close-reading (reviewing Seth Barrett Tillman, Who Can Be President of 
the United States?: Candidate Hillary Clinton and the Problem of Statutory 
Qualifications, 5 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2016) and Seth Barrett Tillman, 
Originalism & the Scope of the Constitution’s Disqualification Clause, 33 QUIN-
NIPIAC L. REV. 59 (2014)) (“Professor Tillman’s theory [which would not treat 
the President as a U.S. Officer under the Foreign Emoluments Clause] makes 
sense of patterns that most of us never saw. It brings order out of chaos. That 
is not to say that his position has been conclusively proven. But at this point, I 
think he has singlehandedly shifted the burden of proof.”). 
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incorrect, much of the analysis here will extend to the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause, which unquestionably does apply. Also, ap-
pointed officers clearly qualify as U.S. Officers, so the analysis 
here will help determine whether they have received prohibited 
emoluments. Thus even those who believe that the President 
does not qualify as a U.S. Officer have plenty of reasons to con-
tinue reading. 
B. EMOLUMENTS AND OFFICE-RELATED COMPENSATION 
After one determines that a government official will be sub-
ject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause, a second set of interpre-
tive questions arises over the scope of the clause’s prohibitions. 
Under the clause, no U.S. Officer can accept, without congres-
sional consent,37 any “present, Emolument, Office, or Title” from 
a foreign government.38 Any of those four prohibitions could 
raise tough interpretive questions,39 but this Article focuses on 
the prohibition related to emoluments. 
Some commentators, including most notably Eisen, Painter, 
and Tribe, interpret “emoluments” as broadly referring to any 
type of profit, gain, or advantage.40 If this expansive definition 
applies to the Foreign Emoluments Clause, a U.S. Officer will 
violate the Constitution upon the acceptance of any type of pay-
ment or benefit from a foreign government. For example, if a 
U.S. Officer owns a business and a representative of a foreign 
government patronizes that business, the acceptance of that cus-
tomer’s payment reflects a prohibited emolument, even if the 
U.S. Officer does not personally participate in the operation of 
that business41 and even if the purchase is made at arm’s 
length.42 
However, under the office-related definition of emolument, 
the term reaches only the various types of compensation received 
 
 37. In describing a U.S. Officer ’s potential acceptance of a present, emolu-
ment, office, or title from a foreign government, this Article will generally as-
sume, for ease of exposition, that no congressional consent has been granted. 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 39. See, e.g., Proposal that the President Accept Honorary Irish Citizen-
ship, 1 Supplemental Op. O.L.C. 278 (May 10, 1963) [hereinafter Irish Citizen-
ship]. 
 40. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 5. 
 41. See id. at 19. 
 42. See id. at 11. 
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for services personally provided.43 For example, if a foreign gov-
ernment paid the United States Secretary of the Treasury a con-
sultation fee in exchange for economic advice, that fee would 
qualify as an emolument.44 However, under the same definition, 
if the Secretary sold goods to a foreign government, the ac-
ceptance of any payments would not give rise to prohibited emol-
uments, at least where the goods were sold at arm’s length.45 
Available historical materials related to the Philadelphia 
Convention and the ratifying conventions do not provide any un-
equivocal evidence of whether the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
refers to the office-related definition of emoluments or the more 
expansive one. Governor Randolph’s statement at the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention simply parrots the constitutional lan-
guage, saying that the President “is restrained from receiving 
any present or emolument whatever.”46 Other ratification-re-
lated statements frequently, though not universally, assume an 
office-related definition.47 
 
 43. For a historical analysis of the compensation schemes applied to officers 
and the shift to a salary model, see PARRILLO, supra note 16. The shift to a 
salary model may help explain why the word emolument fell out of usage, given 
its association with the once-unique benefits associated with an officer. 
 44. See, e.g., Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to H. Gerald Staub, Office of Chief Counsel, 
Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. 2–3 (May 23, 1986) (on file with Minnesota 
Law Review) [hereinafter Alito Memo] (“[A] stipend or consulting fee from a for-
eign government would ordinarily be considered an ‘emolument’ within the 
meaning of the constitutional prohibition.”). 
 45. See infra Part III for a discussion of how above-market payments may 
give rise to prohibited emoluments. 
 46. DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA 
345 (David Robertson ed., 2d ed. 1805). At other points, Randolph seemed to use 
emoluments as a synonym for a gift or an office. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 17 (describing the receipt of a gift 
by a U.S. ambassador and stating that “[i]t was thought proper, in order to ex-
clude corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office from receiv-
ing or holding any emoluments from foreign states”). 
 47. Compare, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33–34 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that State officers might oppose the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution because it may cause a “diminution of the power, 
emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establish-
ments”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 222 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961) (suggesting that the federal government may wish to “employ 
the State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an 
accumulation of their emoluments”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Into the administration of [States] a 
greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater 
number of offices and emoluments will flow.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[M]embers of each department 
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However, consistent with the office-related definition, an al-
most endless number of legal authorities show that when emol-
uments is used in connection with the description of an office, 
officer, or employee, it refers to compensation for services per-
formed.48 In Hoyt v. United States, for example, the Supreme 
 
should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others for the emolu-
ments annexed to their offices.”), and 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787, supra note 17, at 313 (statement of Del. Patrick Henry, Va. 
Ratifying Convention) (“[T]he principal source of corruption in representatives, 
is the hopes and expectations of offices and emoluments.”), with 3 THE DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 483 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891) (statement of Del. James Madison, 
Va. Ratifying Convention) (“[I]f the states had the exclusive imposition of duties 
on exports, they might raise a heavy contribution from other states, for their 
own exclusive emolument.”), and THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 366 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (referring to potential for persons in the 
state administrations “preferring their own emolument and advancement”). 
 48. In many, many cases, the Supreme Court refers to the statutory emol-
uments of an office, where it would be strange to conclude that the term referred 
to anything other than the compensation prescribed for or associated with that 
office. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 914 (1997) (discussing 
Hamilton’s suggestion that the “Federal Government would in some circum-
stances do well ‘to employ the State officers as much as possible, and to attach 
them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments’—which surely sug-
gests inducing state officers to come aboard by paying them, rather than merely 
commandeering their official services” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 222 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 
183, 203 (1984) (“Career service employees who have attained permanent status 
in the career service system have acquired a property interest in their public 
positions and emoluments thereof—such as job security and seniority which 
they may not be deprived of without due process of law.” (quoting FLA. ATT’Y 
GEN., AGO 75–94, CAREER SERVICE SYSTEM—EMPLOYEE’S PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN INTRAAGENCY PROCEEDINGS—REFUSAL TO TAKE POL-
YGRAPH EXAMINATION (1975), http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/ 
printview/53FADB26149700ED852566BA0055662E (alteration omitted))); 
Phelps v. Bd. of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 322 (1937) (“The status of tenure teachers, 
while in one sense perhaps contractual, is in essence dependent on a statute, 
like that of the incumbent of a statutory office, which the Legislature at will 
may abolish, or whose emoluments it may change.” (quoting Phelps v. State Bd. 
of Educ., 180 A. 220, 222 (N.J. 1935))); Nicholas v. United States, 257 U.S. 71, 
76 (1921) (“[O]ne inducted into office or public employment is entitled to the 
privileges or emoluments thereof, until legally separated therefrom . . . .”); Al-
bright v. Territory of N.M. ex rel. Sandoval, 200 U.S. 9, 12 (1906) (“The term of 
office had expired before the rendition of judgment by the Territorial Supreme 
Court, and as to the effect of the judgment of ouster in a suit to recover emolu-
ments for the past, that is collateral, even though the judgment might be con-
clusive in such subsequent action.”); United States v. Mitchell, 109 U.S. 146, 
149–50 (1883) (“[I]nstead of establishing a salary for interpreters at a fixed 
amount, and cutting off all other emoluments and allowances, Congress in-
tended to reduce the salaries and place a fund at the disposal of the Secretary 
of the Interior, from which, at his discretion, additional emoluments and allow-
ances might be given to the interpreters.”); Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227, 
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Court specifically defined emoluments as “embracing every spe-
cies of compensation or pecuniary profit derived from a discharge 
of the duties of the office.”49 In McLean v. United States, the Su-
preme Court again emphasized the connection between emolu-
ments and offices, saying that “emoluments are but expressions 
of value used to give complete recompense to a deserving of-
ficer.”50 And in Hill v. United States the Supreme Court affirmed 
its office-related definition of emoluments, concluding that “a 
sum collected by a clerk for a service not pertaining to his office 
. . . was not a fee or emolument.”51 Given that the Foreign Emol-
uments Clause also speaks of emoluments in connection with of-
fices (under foreign law), one can sensibly apply these Supreme 
Court interpretations to the clause.52 
An office-related definition would also make sense of a pro-
posed constitutional amendment that was designed to broaden 
 
234 (1880) (discussing a statute designed to “define the pay and emoluments of 
certain officers of the army”); United States v. Linn, 40 U.S. (1 Pet.) 290, 313 
(1841) (“These emoluments [related to acting as the receiver for the sale of pub-
lic lands] were the considerations allowed him for the execution of the duties of 
his office; and his appointment and commission entitled him to receive this com-
pensation.”); Minis v. United States, 40 U.S. (1 Pet.) 423, 435–36 (1841) (“[T]he 
president was authorized to employ subaltern officers of the regular army, as 
paymasters, but their compensation was limited expressly to the pay and emol-
uments of a major.”); United States v. Ringgold, 33 U.S. (1 Pet.) 150, 160–61 
(1834) (“By the act of congress . . . it is declared that the marshal shall be enti-
tled to receive, for his services, the . . . emoluments, which are by law allowed 
to the marshal of the United States for the district of Maryland.”); United States 
v. Ripley, 32 U.S. (1 Pet.) 18, 18 (1833) (“The defendant was in the service of the 
United States from 1812 to 1817 . . . and received the pay and emoluments to 
which his rank entitled him.”).  
 49. Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. (1 How.) 109, 135 (1850). 
 50. McLean v. United States, 226 U.S. 374, 382 (1912). In McLean, the 
Court suggested a somewhat narrower definition than the one found in Hoyt, 
stating that emoluments could be understood as the benefits relating to an office 
apart from the fixed compensation. 
 51. United States v. MacMillan, 253 U.S. 195, 205 (1920) (summarizing the 
holding of United States v. Hill, 120 U.S. 169 (1887)). 
 52. The Supreme Court has also emphasized that the presence or absence 
of emoluments goes to whether a person qualifies as an officer, which again 
connects the definition of the term to official duties. See Auffmordt v. Hedden, 
137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) (finding that a merchant appraiser was “without ten-
ure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous duties, and he acts only oc-
casionally and temporarily. Therefore, he is not an ‘officer,’ within the meaning 
of the clause of the Constitution” referring to inferior officers); United States v. 
Hartwell, 73 U.S. (1 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867) (“An office is a public station or em-
ployment, conferred by the appointment of government. The term embraces the 
ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties.”). 
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the Foreign Emoluments Clause.53 That amendment, introduced 
in 1810 and nearly ratified, provided, among other things, that 
any citizen who accepted a “present, pension, office or emolu-
ment of any kind whatever” from a foreign government, without 
the consent of Congress, would “cease to be a citizen of the 
United States.”54 Given the relationship between this amend-
ment and the Foreign Emoluments Clause, the drafters likely 
intended to use emolument in the same way that the Framers 
did.55 Yet if this amendment incorporated the expansive defini-
tion of emolument, rather than the office-related one, it would 
have potentially terminated the citizenship of any American 
who, for example, received interest on foreign government bonds 
or sold some tobacco to a visiting ambassador.56 
It would be odd for an amendment with such potentially se-
vere consequences to receive broad support.57 But the House and 
Senate each passed it by wide margins, and it came within two 
states of ratification.58 It thus seems likely that the proposed 
amendment and, by implication, the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, incorporates an office-related definition of emoluments, 
 
 53. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS 
AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 88-39, at 77–78 (1964). 
 54. See Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, S. Res. 2, 11th Cong. (1810) (“If any citizen of the United States 
shall accept, claim, receive or retain any title of nobility or honour, or shall, 
without the consent of Congress accept and retain any present, pension, office 
or emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince or foreign 
power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be 
incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.”); 
see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 258–59 (1967) (describing “a proposed 
Thirteenth Amendment, subsequently not ratified, which would have provided 
that a person would lose his citizenship by accepting an office or emolument 
from a foreign government”). 
 55. Of course, the proposed amendment does not enjoy independent legal 
effect. However, it provides helpful evidence on the public understanding of 
emoluments under the Constitution. 
 56. For the application of this approach to the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
see BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 5, at 11 (“[T]he best reading of the Clause 
covers even ordinary, fair market value transactions that result in any economic 
profit or benefit to the federal officeholder.”). 
 57. See Gideon M. Hart, The “Original” Thirteenth Amendment: The Mis-
understood Titles of Nobility Amendment, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 311, 328–30 (2010) 
(explaining that state legislative records suggest that “little debate occurred” 
during the early ratifications but that, after the War of 1812, the amendment 
was considered less pressing, decreasing public support); see also 3 STORY, su-
pra note 17 (noting that the proposed thirteenth amendment “has not received 
the ratification of the constitutional number of states to make it obligatory, 
probably from a growing sense, that it is wholly unnecessary”). 
 58. See Hart, supra note 57, at 327–30. 
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rather than the expansive, “any payment or benefit” definition 
advanced by Eisen, Painter, and Tribe.59 
Federal statutes also assume an office-related definition. 
Under 37 U.S.C. § 908, for example,60 Congress expressed its 
consent under the Foreign Emoluments Clause for some retired 
military personnel to receive “compensation for . . . civilian em-
ployment” with foreign governments.61 If Congress thought that 
emoluments reached payments unrelated to one’s office or em-
ployment with a foreign government, why would this statute re-
strict itself to office-related compensation? A U.S. Officer living 
abroad would typically enjoy payments or benefits from a foreign 
country beyond that related to her office or employment, 
whether through tax credits, driver’s licenses, home construc-
tion permits, social welfare payments, or otherwise. If Congress 
believed that payments or benefits other than office-related com-
pensation came within the Foreign Emoluments Clause, it prob-
ably would have expanded the scope of its statute, rather than 
consign our retired servicemen and servicewomen to inevitable 
constitutional violations.62 
An OLC opinion from 1954 also interprets the Foreign Emol-
uments Clause using the Supreme Court’s office-related defini-
tion.63 In the opinion, the OLC addressed a U.S. Officer who had 
served as a judge in Germany but who, under the Nazi regime, 
had to retire on account of his race.64 Later, Germany passed a 
 
 59. Aside from policy consequences, the text of the 1810 proposal suggests 
an office-related definition, by grouping emoluments with pensions and offices. 
See Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708 (1877) (“[A] passage will be best interpreted 
by reference to that which precedes and follows it.”).  
 60. For a second statute taking this approach, see 10 U.S.C. § 1060(a) 
(2012) (granting consent, under specified procedures, to a retired military mem-
ber ’s employment with the military forces of a newly democratic nation, and 
granting consent for the acceptance of compensation associated with that em-
ployment, office, or position). 
 61. Under the statute, Congress’s consent under the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause is conditioned on approval from within the executive branch. See 37 
U.S.C. § 908(b) (2012). This raises an interesting question, not further consid-
ered here, about whether Congress can delegate its consent authority this way. 
 62. One might argue that Congress simply did not think about the types of 
items that a U.S. Officer working abroad might receive. However, in enacting 
the statute, Congress acted carefully, specifically granting its consent to the ac-
ceptance of emoluments, offices, and titles from foreign governments, and with-
holding broad consent to the acceptance of gifts, the fourth item described in the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause. See id. § 908(a) (exercising authority under “the 
last paragraph of section 9 of article I of the Constitution, related to acceptance 
of emoluments, offices, or titles from a foreign government”). 
 63. Rankin Memo, supra note 10, at 7. 
 64. Id. at 1. 
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law to remedy the wrongs it inflicted upon those forced into re-
tirement.65 Under this law, the U.S. Officer claimed a two-hun-
dred and sixty-three dollar monthly annuity from the German 
government.66 This reflected the retirement benefit he would 
have received had he continued to serve.67 The U.S. Officer also 
successfully claimed a fixed payment of approximately four-
thousand dollars from Germany due to the earnings lost on ac-
count of his premature retirement.68 
The Administrative Assistant Attorney General asked the 
OLC to determine whether the U.S. Officer’s acceptance of these 
payments, unquestionably from a foreign government, were pro-
hibited under the Foreign Emoluments Clause.69 In its response, 
the OLC acknowledged that these facts presented a “novel” ques-
tion.70 However, after examining the text, history, and purpose 
of the clause, the OLC concluded that “the term ‘emolument’ . . . 
was intended to cover compensation of any sort arising out of an 
employment relationship with a foreign state.”71 
The OLC then separately applied this office-related defini-
tion to the fixed payment and to the annuity payments.72 Re-
garding the fixed payment, the OLC acknowledged that the For-
eign Emoluments Clause would not prevent a U.S. Officer “from 
receiving damages arising from some wrongful act of a foreign 
state.”73 Because the four-thousand-dollar fixed payment fit that 
description and did not relate to an employment relationship, 
the U.S. Officer could lawfully accept that payment.74 
The OLC also acknowledged the “considerable force” to the 
argument that the German laws were intended “solely to redress 
wrongs of the Nazi regime,” such that the U.S. Officer could also 
accept the full amount of the annuity payments.75 However, the 
OLC noted that retirement annuities were usually “part of the 
emoluments of office.”76 The OLC ultimately advised a cautious 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 2. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 6. 
 71. Id. at 8 (emphasis added) (relying on Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. (1 
How.) 109, 135 (1850)). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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approach, concluding that the annuity payments were not made 
exclusively to redress wrongs, and that they instead at least 
partly related to the U.S. Officer’s position in the foreign govern-
ment. It thus urged that the U.S. Officer seek congressional con-
sent for the annuity payments or resign.77 
This opinion, with which the Comptroller General con-
curred,78 flatly contradicts the approach of Eisen, Painter, and 
Tribe. Under their approach, the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
“reaches any situation in which a federal officeholder receives 
money, items of value, or services from a foreign state.”79 Yet the 
OLC concluded that payments from a foreign government may 
be accepted when they do not relate to an employment relation-
ship with that government.80 Had the OLC adopted the approach 
of the commentators, it would have stated that the four-thou-
sand dollar fixed payment and the two-hundred and sixty-three 
dollar annuity payments were unquestionably emoluments, be-
cause they were payments made by a foreign government. But, 
like the Supreme Court does when dealing with officers, the OLC 
adopted an office-related definition of emoluments and sepa-
rately tested the fixed payment and the annuity payments.81 
The OLC has also applied the office-related definition of 
emoluments in the context of another constitutional provision. 
Under the Domestic Emoluments Clause, 
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Com-
pensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the 
Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive 
within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or 
any of them.82 
This clause fixes the President’s compensation and prohibits the 
receipt of emoluments from domestic government sources (that 
is, from the individual states and the United States). 
 
 77. Id. at 9. 
 78. See Acceptance of Annuity Payments Made by the German Gov’t, 34 
Comp. Gen. 331, 334 (1955) (addressing the same facts as in the 1954 OLC opin-
ion and adopting the same, office-related definition, concluding that payments 
did not constitute emoluments because they “do not stem directly from his prior 
possession of an office under the German government” and could not be charac-
terized “as compensation for services rendered”). On applying the office-related 
definition to the facts, the Comptroller General concluded that all payments re-
ceived by the U.S. Officer, not just the fixed payment, fell outside of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. 
 79. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 5. 
 80. Rankin Memo, supra note 10, at 9. 
 81. See id. at 6–7. 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
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The Domestic Emoluments Clause, like the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause, addresses potential corruption.83 The President’s 
fixed, irreducible compensation prevents Congress from 
“weaken[ing] his fortitude by operating on his necessities.”84 And 
the prohibition against increased emoluments encourages his in-
dependence from Congress, who will not be able to “corrupt his 
integrity by appealing to his avarice.”85 
When President Ronald Reagan took office, a question arose 
under the Domestic Emoluments Clause regarding his retire-
ment payments from the state of California.86 State law estab-
lished his right to those payments on account of his service as 
the Governor of California.87 The White House Counsel asked 
the OLC whether the Domestic Emoluments Clause would pro-
hibit President Reagan’s receipt of them.88 
The OLC first adopted a purposive approach and examined 
whether the retirement benefits would subject the President to 
improper influence. It concluded that they would not.89 Presi-
dent Reagan enjoyed those benefits as a matter of law and did 
not have to perform any further services as a condition to their 
receipt.90 Thus, under a purpose-driven analysis, the retirement 
benefits were not emoluments.91 
It then considered whether its result would change if emol-
uments were defined “exclusively on the basis of the dictionary 
meaning of the term.”92 It noted that the first dictionary defini-
tion contemplated an office-related analysis, and that the sec-
ond, expansive definition had become “obsolete.”93 Using the of-
fice-related definition, the OLC concluded that the retirement 
benefits were not compensation for the services provided by 
 
 83. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference 
to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 642 n.151 
(1996) (“The restriction on Congress’s authority to raise or lower the President’s 
emoluments nevertheless displays a clear purpose of safeguarding the Presi-
dent against improper congressional influence.”). 
 84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
 85. Id. 
 86. President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Ret. Benefits from the State of 
Cal., 5 Op. O.L.C. 187, 187 (1981) [hereinafter President Reagan]. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 192. 
 90. Id. at 189–90. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 190. 
 93. See id. at 188. 
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Reagan in the Governor’s office.94 Consequently, his receipt of 
the California retirement benefits would “not violate the lan-
guage of [the Domestic Emoluments Clause] because those ben-
efits are not emoluments in the constitutional sense.”95 
Once again, the OLC did not simply treat any payment from 
a government as a prohibited emolument. Rather, the payments 
had to reflect compensation for the services the recipient had 
provided. This makes it consistent with the 1954 opinion, which 
also adopted the office-related definition. 
The Legislative Emoluments Clause also adopts an office-
related definition.96 That clause provides that 
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was 
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the 
United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments 
whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person 
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either 
House during his Continuance in Office.97 
Under this clause, legislators cannot take an office when the 
emoluments for that office have increased during the period of 
their Congressional representation. As with the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause, it addresses potential corruption among govern-
ment officials.98 The clause deters a legislator from voting to in-
crease the emoluments of an office with the hope of taking that 
office after she leaves the House or Senate.99 
This clause must refer only to office-related compensation. 
That, after all, is the matter over which Congress enjoys control. 
 
 94. See id. at 191 (“Under California law retirement benefits . . . constitute 
an incident of the pensionable status. They are neither a gift nor a part of the 
retiree’s compensation, earned while employed, the payment of which is de-
ferred until after his retirement.”). The OLC’s conclusion on this point seems 
doubtful, and the Comptroller General adopted a different line of analysis when 
he opined on the issue. See infra Part III.C. 
 95. See President Reagan, supra note 86, at 192. 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. This provision is more commonly referred 
to as the Ineligibility Clause, but given the orientation of this Article, it will be 
referred to as the Legislative Emoluments Clause. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Teachout, supra note 23, at 359–60 (explaining that Framers were con-
cerned that “members of Congress would use their position to enrich themselves 
and their friends, and that they would see public office as a place for gaining 
civil posts and preferences, instead of as a public duty”). 
 99. Of course, given the plain language of the clause, the legislator would 
be prohibited from assuming the office even if she voted against any increase in 
the emoluments for that office. 
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A court could not fairly interpret the clause as prohibiting a leg-
islator from taking an office when the prior officer enjoyed an 
increase in payments or benefits unrelated to her office. 
A political controversy related to the clause confirms this 
understanding. In 1937, a vacancy opened on the Supreme Court 
and President Roosevelt nominated for the position Senator 
Hugo Black, who had voted for all of Roosevelt’s New Deal initi-
atives.100 However, during Black’s Senate term, Congress had 
established a pension for Justices who retired at age seventy or 
later.101 Opponents of his nomination argued that this reflected 
an increase in the emoluments of a Justice’s office, which would 
make Black ineligible for the appointment.102 
During the ensuing Congressional debates, Senator Burke 
argued that emoluments included “everything that makes the of-
fice attractive,”103 including a new pension. But two Senators al-
leged absurd results under Burke’s broad definition, saying that 
it would treat, as emoluments, the replacement of a hard office 
chair with a soft one, the installation of air conditioning in the 
Supreme Court building, the provision of an additional secre-
tary, and so on.104 They thus countered that emoluments in-
cluded little more than the salaries fixed by Congress.105 Senator 
Burke defended his position by arguing that emoluments in-
cluded “practically” everything that made an office attractive, 
and not literally everything.106 In the end, the Senate got past 
this disagreement and confirmed Senator Black’s appointment. 
The Senate may very well have erred in confirming Black 
despite the establishment of the pension regime. However, for 
 
 100. See 81 CONG. REC. 9076–86 (1937); see also John F. O’Connor, The 
Emoluments Clause: An Anti-Federalist Intruder in a Federalist Constitution, 
24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 113–18 (1995). 
 101. See An Act to Provide for Retirement of the Justices of the Supreme 
Court, Pub. L. No. 75-10 (1937) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2012)); see also 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 219 (1974) (dis-
cussing Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam)). 
 102. See 81 CONG. REC. 9076–86 (1937); see also Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. at 
633 (rejecting, on standing grounds, a petition to have Justice Black removed 
for a violation of the Legislative Emoluments Clause). 
 103. 81 CONG. REC. 9076 (1937) (emphasis added) (discussing McLean v. 
United States, 226 U. S. 374 (1912)). 
 104. Id. at 9086; see also id. at 9083 (“[T]he Senator from Nebraska[—Sena-
tor Burke—]said that this hazy sort of thing called the privilege of retiring when 
a man gets to be 70 years of age is an increase in the emoluments.”). 
 105. Id. (statement of Sen. Connally) (acknowledging that increase in salary 
would qualify as an emolument). 
 106. Id. at 9077. 
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present purposes, the relevant point is that the Senate debates 
all focused on office-related compensation in defining emolu-
ments. Even Senator Burke, the fiercest opponent of Senator 
Black’s appointment, did not interpret an emolument to refer to 
any payment or benefit. 
This provides yet another indication that the interpretation 
offered by Eisen, Painter, and Tribe goes too far. Emoluments 
refer to only the compensation received in exchange for services 
provided as an officer or employee. Reading the Foreign, Domes-
tic, and Legislative Emoluments Clauses together supports this 
interpretation. 
However, one might argue that the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause merits a distinct interpretation. The clause prohibits 
gifts, emoluments, offices, and titles, “of any kind whatever.”107 
The quoted language suggests that emoluments under that 
clause may be defined more broadly than under the Legislative 
Emoluments Clause, at least. (The Domestic Emoluments 
Clause also applies to any emolument.) 
Emoluments under the Foreign Emoluments Clause may 
very well enjoy an especially broad interpretation. Rather than 
act to clarify, the phrase “of any kind whatever” may expand the 
scope of potential emoluments. That is, though pensions might 
not come within the Legislative Emoluments Clause, they would 
come within the Foreign Emoluments Clause, along with any 
other office-related compensation. And gifts, no matter how 
small or large, would also come within it.108 In this way, the final 
four words resolve borderline cases in favor of inclusion.109 
One might argue that the phrase “of any kind whatever” 
does even greater work. Under this potential line of analysis, “of 
any kind whatever” would change the meaning of emolument, 
 
 107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 108. See Gifts from Foreign Prince, supra note 29, at 118 (“[E]ven a simple 
remembrance of courtesy . . . like the photographs in this case, falls under the 
inclusion of ‘any present . . . of any kind whatever.’”); Teachout, supra note 23, 
at 362 (explaining that the Foreign Emoluments Clause “includes the striking 
line ‘of any kind whatever ’ . . . . If foreigners were to attempt to buy influence 
or access, or use small gifts to shift the sympathies of American agents, they 
needed the full consent of Congress.”). 
 109. Eisen, Painter, and Tribe rely on the phrase “of any kind whatever” to 
support their broad interpretation of emoluments. See BROOKINGS REPORT, su-
pra note 5. However, in attempting to give meaning to that phrase, they render 
meaningless part of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. That is, if emoluments 
include any payment or benefit of any kind, then the clause’s separate reference 
to presents would have no effect, nor would the reference to pensions in the 
proposed 1810 amendment. 
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such that the Foreign Emoluments Clause reaches all benefits, 
not just office-related compensation. However, that analysis 
would be flawed. 
The Articles of Confederation twice used the broad phrase 
“emolument of any kind,” once in connection with its version of 
the Legislative Emoluments Clause and once with its version of 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause.110 And under the Articles’ ver-
sion of the Legislative Emolument Clause, the phrase “emolu-
ment of any kind” referred only to office-related compensation, 
with nothing suggesting that the second usage, relating to for-
eign emoluments, carried a different meaning.111 The 1810 pro-
posal to expand the Foreign Emoluments Clause also referred to 
an “emolument of any kind whatever,” and for reasons discussed 
earlier, it is highly doubtful that that phrase reached any pay-
ment from a foreign government.112 
More generally, a phrase like “of any kind whatever” should 
not affect the threshold definition of a word that precedes it. For 
example, if someone asks for “a lift of any kind whatever,” he 
might be asking for a ride to his destination or for an elevator. 
The context of the statement, not the phrase “of any kind what-
ever,” would resolve the ambiguity. Someone stranded on a high-
way probably wants any kind of ride, while someone construct-
ing a building probably wants any kind of elevator. 
One might respond that a phrase like “of any kind what-
ever” can establish multiple meanings for a word preceding it, 
but this would be much too clever. No one, in ordinary English, 
would use the phrase “a lift of any kind whatever” to ask for ei-
ther a ride or an elevator,113 and the Framers did not adopt a 
 
 110. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 2 (stating that 
no delegate may “be capable of holding any office under the [U]nited [S]tates, 
for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees or emolument 
of any kind”); see also id. art. VI, para. 1 (“[No] person holding any office of profit 
or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept any present, emolu-
ment, office or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince or foreign 
state . . . .”). 
 111. The Articles’ version of the Legislative Emoluments Clause sensibly re-
fers to office-related compensation for the same reasons that the Constitution’s 
version does. See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text. 
 112. See also Quackenbush v. United States, 177 U.S. 20, 23 (1900) (discuss-
ing Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227 (1880), and using the phrase “emolu-
ments of any kind” to describe the compensation related to the claimant’s posi-
tion as an officer in the navy). 
 113. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 587 (2008) (giving a 
single word two meanings, as in interpreting “[h]e filled and kicked the bucket” 
to mean “[h]e filled the bucket and died,” would be “[g]rotesque”). 
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similarly strange approach in the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 
That is, when the clause speaks of a “Title . . . of any kind what-
ever,” it refers only to honorifics provided by a foreign govern-
ment, not also to titles in real estate.114 And when it speaks of 
an “Office . . . of any kind whatever,” it refers only to employment 
positions, not also to boxed workspaces.115 And when it speaks 
of an “[e]molument . . . of any kind whatever,”116 it refers only to 
office-related compensation,117 not to any “[a]dvantage, benefit, 
[or] comfort.”118 
The distinction between the office-related and the expansive 
definition of emoluments reminds one of the different meanings 
imparted by modern day financial terms like “profitable.” That 
is, a person could, consistent with normal English usage, say 
that she found it profitable to read the poetry of Robert Frost. 
But if she said that her business was profitable, the listener 
would likely assume that the term referred to the excess of rev-
enues over costs. In the same way, the expansive dictionary def-
inition of emoluments reveals a nontechnical use, but when 
emoluments is used in connection with an office, as under the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, it naturally refers to the compen-
sation one receives in exchange for services provided. 
Putting aside these textual arguments, strange results 
would follow if emoluments under the Constitution included 
things other than office-related compensation. To see why this is 
so, we can return to the Domestic Emoluments Clause, whose 
 
 114. See Irish Citizenship, supra note 39, at 281–82 (construing “title” under 
Foreign Emoluments Clause by associating it with honorifics). 
 115. See Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Proposed Serv. of Gov’t Emp. 
on Comm’n of Int’l Historians, 11 Op. O.L.C. 89, 91 (1987) [hereinafter Int’l His-
torians] (defining “office” by considering whether membership with a foreign 
commission “would create the kind of ‘official relation’ . . . that the Framers of 
the Constitution wished to avoid”). 
 116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 117. See Rankin Memo, supra note 10 (“[T]he term ‘emolument’ . . . particu-
larly since it is modified by the phrase ‘of any kind whatever,’ was intended to 
cover compensation of any sort arising out of an employment relationship with 
a foreign state.”). 
 118. A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 
10 (“1. Profit or gain arising from station, office, or employment; dues; reward, 
remuneration, salary. 2. Advantage, benefit, comfort.”); see also McLean v. 
United States, 226 U.S. 374, 383 (1912) (examining the statutory phrase “[a]ll 
back . . . emoluments” and concluding that “[i]t especially expresses the perqui-
sites of an office”). 
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purposes and scope mirror its foreign counterpart.119 If that 
clause applies to any payment from a state or federal govern-
ment, then former President Obama would have violated the 
Constitution. That is, his financial disclosures reveal that he 
owned between five-hundred thousand and one million dollars of 
U.S. Treasury bonds during his time in office, and that he had 
received interest payments on them.120 The interest income paid 
by the United States to President Obama did not form part of 
the fixed compensation attached to his presidency, and if an 
emolument includes any payment, President Obama’s receipt of 
interest income from the United States violated the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause. Under the approach of Eisen, Painter, and 
Tribe, President Obama committed a potentially impeachable of-
fense.121 
This is not a sensible result, and no potential impeachment 
could have properly occurred under an office-related definition 
of emoluments.122 That is, President Obama earned interest in-
come from the United States in his capacity as a creditor, not in 
connection with the services he provided as President. And given 
the absence of any link between the interest income and his pro-
vision of services, President Obama should not have been im-
peached, nor should any U.S. Officers who purchase, at arm’s 
 
 119. Like the Foreign Emoluments Clause, the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause addresses potential corruption and applies to any emolument. U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
 120. See BARACK OBAMA, EXECUTIVE BRANCH PERSONNEL PUBLIC FINAN-
CIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
whitehouse.gov/files/documents/oge_278_cy_2015_obama_051616.pdf (report-
ing between five-hundred thousand and one million dollars of Treasury bonds 
held by Obama directly or through an IRA). 
 121. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 5, at 18, 22 (arguing that violations 
of the Foreign Emoluments Clause establish an impeachable offense). Presum-
ably, the authors would extend their approach to the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause, although that remains to be seen. In any event, the types of conduct 
that would justify presidential impeachment remain subject to debate. See gen-
erally Cass R. Sunstein, Impeachment and Stability, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 699 
(1999) (discussing the appropriate understanding of high crimes and misde-
meanors as it relates to impeachment). Though the Constitution does not ex-
plicitly mandate impeachment for the violation of any emoluments clause, it 
may very well allow it. 
 122. See Seth B. Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s 
“Emoluments” Problem, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 759, 764–67 (2017) (“Presi-
dent George Washington, in a private capacity, engaged in business transac-
tions for value with the Federal Government, notwithstanding that he received 
or intended to receive a pecuniary advantage. . . . [Y]et, no one then, or since, 
has ever impugned the propriety of his conduct, much less the legal validity or 
constitutionality of his purchases.”). 
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length, bonds from a foreign government and receive interest in-
come on them.123 
Aside from monetary payments, Eisen, Painter, and Tribe’s 
definition of emoluments reaches things like building permits, 
trademarks, and licenses from foreign governments.124 Under 
that definition, a U.S. Officer would violate the Constitution if a 
foreign country granted her a building permit to modify her va-
cation residence there or a temporary permit to operate a motor 
vehicle. However, under an office-related definition, U.S. Offic-
ers can obtain a foreign government’s permission to acquire 
these things without worrying about impeachment. 
One might respond that, even aside from an office-related 
interpretation, a purposive interpretation of the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause would protect U.S. Officers from many impeach-
ment claims. That may very well be so, depending on how one 
defines purpose125 and the extent to which one incorporates that 
concept in constitutional interpretation (a source of never-end-
ing debate).126 But Eisen, Painter, and Tribe argue that any pay-
ment or benefit violates the Foreign Emoluments Clause, en-
tirely “apart from any actual quid pro quo arrangements or 
demonstrable bribes or payoffs,” and that even a hotel room res-
ervation fee establishes a constitutional violation.127 Congress 
 
 123. Statutory law may prohibit an officer from maintaining investments in 
foreign governments, so as to avoid conflicts of interests or other concerns. But 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause would not prohibit it. 
 124. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 5, at 18; see also Norman Eisen, 
Richard W. Painter, and Laurence H. Tribe, 5 Ways You’ll Know if Trump Is 
Playing by the Rules, POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.politico.com/ 
magazine/story/2017/01/trump-business-ethics-eisen-painter-tribe-214619 
(stating that emoluments include “building permits and trademarks”). 
 125. In its 1954 opinion, discussed supra note 10, the OLC considered the 
purpose of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and concluded, consistent with this 
Article’s thesis, that emoluments referred to office-related compensation. See 
Rankin Memo, supra note 10, at 9 (“Keeping in mind that the purpose of the 
clause was to prevent undue influence [the Foreign Emoluments Clause] was 
intended to cover compensation of any sort arising out of an employment rela-
tionship with a foreign state.”). However, if someone assigned a different pur-
pose to the clause, she might establish a broader or narrower definition. 
 126. This Article has focused heavily on published legal authorities in deter-
mining the meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Scholarly analysis un-
der different perspectives, such as originalist or purposivist perspectives, would 
reflect a welcome contribution to the literature. For a contribution to the debate 
under a purely originalist perspective, see Natelson, supra note 10. 
 127. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 5, at 18; see also, e.g., Memoran-
dum from John O. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Coun-
sel, to James H. Thessin, Assistant Legal Adviser for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State 
n.2 (Aug. 29, 1988) (on file with Minnesota Law Review) (“[T]he application of 
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has also sometimes taken a strict approach to the clause, refus-
ing Thomas Pinckney’s request to accept small gifts he received 
from Great Britain and Spain.128 Thus the problems associated 
with an excessively broad definition of emoluments cannot 
simply be assumed away, especially whenever Congress adopts 
a hostile attitude towards the President or any individual U.S. 
Officers. 
Notably, each house of Congress, through its committees, 
recognizes that an office-related definition controls the interpre-
tation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. The House of Repre-
sentatives’ ethics manual, for example, recites the office-related 
definition of emoluments and warns that “[m]embers and em-
ployees may not . . . receive any payment for services rendered to 
official foreign interests, such as ambassadors, embassies, or 
agencies of a foreign government.”129 The Senate’s ethics manual 
contains similar language, stating that an “‘emolument’ means 
‘any profit, gain, or compensation received for services ren-
dered.’”130 If the views of the House and Senate ethics commit-
tees were displaced by those of Eisen, Painter, and Tribe, there 
would be adverse consequences not only for U.S. Officers, but for 
U.S. representatives and senators as well. 
Of course, the harsh consequences of any given interpreta-
tion should not by itself disqualify it.131 If the Constitution really 
 
the Clause . . . does not turn upon the existence of any actual conflict of inter-
est.”); Int’l Historians, supra note 115, at 91 (finding that Foreign Emoluments 
applied to government employee but disclaiming any suggestion that he would 
be subject to improper foreign influence). 
 128. See President’s Council, supra note 20, at 58 (“[I]n 1798, Thomas Pinck-
ney asked Congress for permission to retain small presents he received from the 
Kings of Great Britain and Spain upon his departure from Europe.”); DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–
1801, at 281–84 (1997); 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 553 (1798) (Senate granting con-
sent); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1593 (1798) (House refusing consent); see also, e.g., 
7 CONG. REC. 1331 (1878) (statement of Sen. Aaron A. Sargent) (expressing con-
cern that President Hayes accepted from an Indian tribe a miniature canoe, of 
apparently trivial value, without seeking congressional consent). 
 129. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 
206 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 130. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 86 (2003) (quoting 
Sec’y of the Air Force, 49 Comp. Gen. 819, 820 (1970)). 
 131. The extent to which consequences may affect constitutional interpreta-
tion reflects a continuously and hotly debated topic. For some different view-
points on the subject, see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING 
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 18 (2005) (“[S]ince law is connected to life, 
judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to consequences.”) 
(emphasis omitted); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 37 (1997) 
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prohibits a U.S. Officer or legislator from accepting, without con-
sent, any payment or benefit from a foreign government, and if 
the Constitution absolutely prohibits the President from receiv-
ing even a penny from the states or the federal government 
(aside from his fixed compensation), then so be it. It will be upon 
the people to amend the Constitution or upon the Congress (or 
its houses) to exercise any discretion under the relevant consent, 
impeachment, or removal powers. But where a term in the Con-
stitution admits two potential meanings and one meaning avoids 
strange consequences, consideration of those consequences can 
help resolve an ambiguity.132 That is especially the case here, 
where only the office-related definition of emoluments comports 
with executive and legislative branch interpretations, and estab-
lishes consistency among the Constitution’s three uses of the 
term. 
C. NATURE OF SERVICES PROVIDED 
Part I.B showed that an emolument under the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause refers to the compensation a U.S. Officer re-
ceives for services provided to a foreign government. However, 
an important ambiguity remains. Must the services provided re-
late to the U.S. Officer’s position with the U.S. government (a 
U.S.-focused approach)? Or does the clause prohibit the ac-
ceptance of compensation related to services of any kind pro-
vided to a foreign government (a foreign-focused approach)? 
The clause could arguably adopt either approach. Viewed 
one way, because the clause specifically applies to U.S. Officers, 
a U.S.-focused approach might be warranted. Viewed another 
way, because the clause generally prohibits things established 
under foreign law, like titles and offices,133 a broad, foreign-fo-
cused approach should control.134 
 
(advocating an originalist method to constitutional interpretation, under which 
the original public meaning controls over any perceived policy consequences). 
 132. See Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A 
View from the Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 99 (2006) (arguing 
that even originalists “do not believe that purpose and consequence are totally 
irrelevant to deciding cases”). 
 133. A foreign government has no authority to establish titles or offices un-
der U.S. law, so it would not make sense to read the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause as prohibiting a U.S. Officer from accepting a U.S. title or office from a 
foreign power. 
 134. One might wonder whether reading the clause this way renders the 
prohibition against the acceptance of emoluments redundant. After all, if the 
clause already prohibits the acceptance of an office, would it not necessarily 
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In many cases, wrestling with this ambiguity may be avoid-
able because the two approaches will yield the same result. For 
example, suppose that a foreign government wanted to hire the 
United States Secretary of Transportation to consult on an ur-
ban highway project. Under a U.S.-focused approach, her ac-
ceptance of the consulting fee would create constitutional prob-
lems, because that emolument relates to her U.S. office 
(transportation matters). And under a foreign-focused approach, 
this engagement would also create problems because the emolu-
ment stems directly from her employment with the foreign gov-
ernment. 
In other circumstances, however, the distinction between a 
U.S.-focused and a foreign-focused approach will make a differ-
ence. Suppose that the Secretary of Transportation wanted to 
accept compensation while serving as a tuba player in a foreign 
government’s official marching band. Under a U.S.-focused ap-
proach, that acceptance would not create constitutional prob-
lems because tuba playing has nothing to do with her U.S. office. 
However, under a foreign-focused approach, that acceptance 
would create constitutional problems because the compensation 
stems from her employment with the foreign government. 
No judicial opinions address the U.S.-versus-foreign ques-
tion, but other authorities strongly favor a broad, foreign-focused 
approach. Recall, for example, that the constitutional amend-
ment proposed in 1810 would have prohibited any citizen from 
accepting “emolument[s] of any kind whatever” from a foreign 
government.135 That amendment, intended to expand the For-
eign Emoluments Clause, must have referred to all compensa-
tion related to employment with a foreign government, not only 
to compensation related to the recipient’s position with the U.S. 
government. After all, most persons potentially subject to the 
 
prohibit the acceptance of office-related compensation? But that source of con-
fusion arises only because of the shorthand (office-related compensation) that 
this Article has used to describe the scope of emoluments. That is, this Article 
argues that emoluments refer broadly to any compensation received in ex-
change for services provided to a foreign government and not only the compen-
sation derived from holding an office under foreign law. However, it’s at least 
arguable that emoluments refer only to the compensation that is derived from 
a foreign office. If this interpretation were followed, the separate reference to 
emoluments in the Foreign Emoluments Clause would not necessarily be redun-
dant, because Congress could consent to a U.S. Officer ’s holding of an office un-
der foreign law without allowing him to accept the related emoluments, or vice 
versa. 
 135. Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, S. RES. 2, 11th Cong. (1810). 
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clause (all U.S. citizens) did not hold official positions with the 
United States. 
OLC opinions generally do not delve into the U.S.-versus-
foreign question, possibly because the analysis often makes no 
difference. However, the previously discussed 1954 opinion em-
braced the foreign-focused approach. That opinion, addressing 
the judge displaced by the Nazis, focused on whether the pay-
ments he received related to his judgeship under German law, 
without regard to the nature of the services he provided to the 
United States.136 
Congress also assumes the foreign orientation of emolu-
ments. The previously discussed statute, 37 U.S.C. § 908, regard-
ing retired military personnel, applies broadly to all civilian em-
ployment with a foreign power, not just to positions related to 
the service member’s position under U.S. law.137 Also, the Comp-
troller General, an officer in the legislative branch, has applied 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause to a U.S. Officer’s compensation 
from a foreign government where that compensation bore no re-
lationship to his duties under U.S. law.138 
 
 136. Rankin Memo, supra note 10, at 1; see also Acceptance of Annuity Pay-
ments Made by the German Gov’t, 34 Comp. Gen. 331, 334 (1955) (adopting a 
similar method of analysis). 
 137. Because the statute applies only to civilian employment, it potentially 
prohibits a U.S. Officer from taking any position with a foreign government re-
lated to his U.S. position. For example, a retired U.S. pilot could not invoke 37 
U.S.C. § 908 (2012) to support his enlistment in the (non-civilian) air force of a 
foreign government. This further indicates congressional understanding that 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause addresses the compensation received for all 
types of positions with foreign governments, as opposed to being a measure de-
signed to vaguely prohibit the exploitation of one’s office under U.S. law. For 
further discussion, see Andy Grewal, Exploitation of Public Office and the For-
eign Emoluments Clause, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (July 4, 2017), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/exploitation-of-public-office-and-the-foreign-emoluments 
-clause. 
 138. Ellis, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 37 Comp. Gen. 138, 140 (1957) 
(saying the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to a federal court crier ’s receipt 
of a pension from the British government for war services, whether that pension 
qualified as a gift or an emolument); Ward v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 46 (1982) 
(an advisory opinion issued in connection with congressional reference proce-
dures, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (2012) (outlining congressional reference case 
procedures)); Gordon, U.S. Coast Guard, 44 Comp. Gen. 130, 130–31 (1964) (in-
volving a retired Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard subjected to the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause on account of a teaching position taken with a foreign pub-
lic school). In a 1962 memorandum, the OLC hypothesized that if a foreign gov-
ernment paid for a U.S. Officer’s local tour of its country, and the tour related 
to the officer ’s U.S. duties, the tour would not qualify as an emolument, because 
a “literal construction” is not always required under the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause. See Irish Citizenship, supra note 39. This hypothetical at least obliquely 
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These authorities show that the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause applies to all compensation for services a U.S. Officer re-
ceives through an office or employment relationship with a for-
eign government. However, solely for the sake of being compre-
hensive, where a U.S.-focused approach would potentially 
narrow the clause’s scope, this Article will examine the issues 
alternatively. 
II.  A PROPOSED BUSINESS ENTITY TEST   
Settling the definition of emoluments, and the nature of ser-
vices to which they relate, does not end the constitutional anal-
ysis. One must still determine, as a factual matter, whether a 
payment received by a U.S. Officer stems from his office or em-
ployment with a foreign government. Part III will consider that 
question for transactions involving President Trump. But before 
proceeding to that question, another important problem, related 
to the interposition of legal entities between foreign govern-
ments and U.S. Officers, must be addressed. After explaining the 
nature of the problem and describing the different tests that the 
Comptroller General and the OLC have used to address it, this 
Part will propose an alternative three-part business entity test 
to guide the analysis. The proposed business entity test more 
faithfully implements the language of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause than does the Comptroller General’s or the OLC’s. 
To understand the conceptual difficulties raised by business 
entities, recall that under the Foreign Emoluments Clause, no 
person holding a U.S. office may accept, without consent, an 
emolument from a foreign government.139 The clause’s reference 
to a person surely refers to a natural person, not an entity. After 
all, only individuals can qualify as U.S. Officers. 
One might consequently argue that a U.S. Officer cannot vi-
olate the clause when a foreign government makes a payment 
only to an entity in which she owns an interest. Under this anal-
ysis, the U.S. Officer will not have accepted any emolument from 
a foreign government, as required by the clause. Only the entity 
will have made an acceptance. And any payment subsequently 
received by the U.S. Officer will be from the entity, not from a 
foreign government. 
 
assumes that only payments related to a U.S. Officer ’s position with the U.S. 
government would meet the threshold definition of emolument, though it is 
quite doubtful that the implications of this hypothetical can overcome the 
weight of numerous contrary, direct interpretations. 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
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This analysis enjoys some superficial appeal, but in the con-
text of statutory law, courts sometimes disregard the existence 
of an intermediary when characterizing the flow of payments. 
That is, a payment that literally travels from A to B to C may 
sometimes be treated as a payment from A to C.140 One can rea-
sonably conclude that, if the text of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause permits, a similar analysis could apply to a payment that 
travels from F to E to O (that is, a payment that travels from a 
foreign government (F) to an entity (E) to a U.S. Officer (O)). 
However, the principal difficulty relates to determining when to 
re-characterize a transaction this way.141 
Under one possible approach, supported by the Comptroller 
General, the Foreign Emoluments Clause analysis could follow 
general state or federal law.142 That is, a payment from F to E to 
O could be treated as a payment from F to O whenever that char-
acterization attaches under the general principles distilled from 
state and federal statutes.143 This approach has the virtue of 
building upon an established set of precedents. 
 
 140. See, e.g., Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938) (disre-
garding, for federal tax purposes, an intermediary in a corporate distribution 
because “[a] given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different 
result because reached by following a devious path”). 
 141. Existing law and scholarship provides little with which to work. See 
Alito Memo, supra note 44, at 1 (“We have found no judicial opinions construing 
the Emoluments Clause in which the identity of the source of an emolument 
was at issue; nor have we found any discussion of this issue in any relevant 
commentary.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Hartnett, USMC (Retired), 69 Comp. Gen. 220, 221–22 (1990) 
(“Our decisions concerning whether an employer-employee relationship exists 
for purposes of the restrictions [under the Foreign Emoluments Clause] on for-
eign government employment have consistently applied the five-part test for-
mulated by the Maryland Court of Appeals in National Paving and Contracting 
Co., 134 A.2d 296, 301 (1957).”); Hartnett, USMC, Retired, March 10, 1986, 65 
Comp. Gen. 382, 382–83 (1986) (disregarding interposed entity that employed 
a U.S. Officer who, by contract, provided services to a foreign government, be-
cause the foreign government supervised and controlled him). These authorities 
do not actually negate the legal existence of an entity for all legal purposes, but 
rather follow general corporate veil-piercing principles in determining whether 
to disregard an interposed entity for purposes of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause. See Retired Marine Corps Officers, B-217096, 1985 WL 52377 (Comp. 
Gen. Mar. 11, 1985) (disregarding the existence of a professional corporation 
interposed between U.S. Officers, who were attorneys, and the corporation’s cli-
ent, a foreign government, where Virginia state law provided that such interpo-
sition did not affect the attorney-client relationship). 
 143. In performing this type of analysis, the Comptroller General has some-
times applied the law of a single state, see, for example, Hartnett, 69 Comp. 
Gen. at 221–22 (following the five-part test in National Paving). But because 
the Constitution is a national law, the meaning of its terms generally should 
not depend on the particularities of state law unless expressly indicated. 
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However, the Comptroller General’s approach could se-
verely curtail the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Under the Comp-
troller General’s approach, an interposed entity will be disre-
garded where a U.S. Officer “is technically hired by a private 
firm but is a de facto employee of a foreign government.”144 In 
other words, the Comptroller General will pierce the corporate 
veil where the foreign government has the right to control the 
performance and manner of the U.S. Officer’s work. This strict 
standard means that the Foreign Emoluments Clause will rarely 
apply to high-level U.S. Officers who perform services through 
business entities,145 given the ease with which they can avoid 
employee characterization.146 
 
Cf. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 122 
(1944) (declining to hinge the definition of “employee” in a federal statute on 
various local laws and relying instead on “a sort of pervading general essence 
distilled from state law”). Of course, to the extent that National Paving reflects 
the general common law, a point not further considered here, little harm would 
be caused by adopting its framework rather than a more general one. Also, the 
Comptroller General has sometimes looked to more general principles. See 
Breningstall, Dep’t of the Air Force, 53 Comp. Gen. 753 (1974) (applying com-
mon law master-servant principles, as generally stated in Maloof v. United 
States, 242 F. Supp. 175, 181 (1965), to find that a U.S. Officer, who was tech-
nically employed by a private company, was in fact treated as an employee of 
the foreign government-owned corporation which contracted with the private 
company). 
 144. Applicant for Sec. Clearance, ISCR Case No. 00-0244 (Dep’t of Def. Ap-
peal Bd., Jan. 29, 2001), http://ogc.osd.mil/doha/industrial/00-0244.a1.html 
(summarizing Gordon, U.S. Coast Guard, 44 Comp. Gen. 130 (1964); Bren-
ingstall, 53 Comp. Gen.; Shaffer, USAF, Retired, 62 Comp. Gen. 432 (1983); Re-
tired Marine Corps Officers, 1985 WL 52377; and Hartnett, 65 Comp. Gen. at 
382). 
 145. Under statutory law, the interposed entity may be disregarded, but only 
under high standards. Even when it is obvious that the payor, in a substantial 
sense, seeks the services of an entity’s owner rather than the entity itself, the 
form of the transaction will usually govern. For example, suppose that a patient 
has a favorite dentist whom he has seen for decades and that he refuses to see 
anyone else. Notwithstanding the patient’s personal affections for the dentist, 
if the dentist operates her practice through a wholly-owned corporation, the cus-
tomer ’s payment for services will generally be treated as a payment to that cor-
poration. Also, the law will not treat the dentist as having earned income di-
rectly from the patient. She will have derived income from her corporation, 
whether in the form of a salary, dividend, or otherwise. The Comptroller Gen-
eral’s approach, if applied in this context, would not pierce the corporate veil 
given the inability of the patient to control the performance and manner of the 
dentist’s work. 
 146. The Comptroller General opinions seem to involve low-level U.S. Offic-
ers, mostly retired, who have little choice but to follow the dictates of their em-
ploying corporation’s demands, as opposed to powerful persons like the Presi-
dent or cabinet members, who can provide consultations with foreign 
governments through entities that they control. 
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The OLC has adopted, through several opinions, something 
resembling a conduit147 test, which provides a second potential 
approach. In 1982, for example, the OLC addressed whether a 
U.S. Officer who worked with the Mexican government at the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission could continue doing so while 
on leave.148 To continue his work, the U.S. Officer would take up 
short-term employment with a small, incorporated consulting 
firm.149 The Mexican government would hire the firm specifi-
cally to continue its relationship with the U.S. Officer and some, 
though not all, of the proceeds from the firm’s contract would be 
passed along to him.150 
To address whether the U.S. Officer received a prohibited 
emolument from the Mexican government, as opposed to a salary 
from the consulting firm, the OLC adopted a functional analy-
sis.151 It emphasized that the U.S. Officer provided the specific 
expertise sought by the Mexican government, and that the gov-
ernment chose the firm largely because of him.152 Under these 
facts, the OLC concluded, the interposition of the incorporated 
consulting firm did not exempt the U.S. Officer from the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause.153  
In reaching that conclusion, the OLC distinguished a prior 
memorandum dealing with a consulting contract between Har-
vard University and the Government of Indonesia.154 Under that 
contract, Harvard itself determined the personnel who would 
 
 147. Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Gov’t Members of 
ACUS, 17 Op. O.L.C. 114, 118 (1993) [hereinafter Non-Gov’t ACUS] (“[O]ur 
prior opinions suggest that when an employment relationship formally exists 
between a domestic employer and a [U.S. Officer], the question whether the lat-
ter may be paid from foreign governmental funds that the employer receives 
turns on whether the employer is acting as a mere conduit for those funds.”). 
 148. See Application of the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution & the 
Foreign Gifts & Decorations Act, 6 Op. O.L.C. 156 (1982) [hereinafter Foreign 
Gifts]. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 158. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. (discussing Memorandum from Leon Ulman, Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John G. Gaine, Gen. Counsel, Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n (Aug. 11, 1980)); see also Alito Memo, supra note 44, 
at 1 n.5.  
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fulfill its consulting obligations.155 Thus, when Harvard pro-
posed to staff the contract with faculty experts who were also 
U.S. Officers, no Foreign Emoluments Clause problems arose.156 
In 1993, the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS), a federal government agency, attempted to apply the 
1982 OLC ruling to its members.157 Those members, who appar-
ently qualified as U.S. Officers, received no compensation for 
their U.S. government services and included, among others, per-
sons who simultaneously practiced as partners in private law 
firms.158 A question arose whether a member could accept a pro 
rata distribution of his partnership’s income where his firm 
served foreign government clients and earned fees from them.159 
In arguing that the U.S. Officer could, ACUS emphasized 
that the member-partner did not himself represent any foreign 
government.160 Rather, under his partnership agreement, he 
simply enjoyed a pro rata share of all partnership income.161 Re-
lying on the 1982 OLC opinion, ACUS reasoned that no prohib-
ited emolument arose “absent some direct personal contact or re-
lationship between the Conference member and a foreign 
government.”162 
The OLC, however, rejected ACUS’s position. It acknowl-
edged that its 1982 opinion embraced a conduit standard, involv-
ing circumstances where a foreign government specifically 
sought out the services of a U.S. Officer employed by an incorpo-
rated consulting firm.163 But it believed that the analysis dif-
fered with partnerships.164 Though its reasoning is not quite 
clear, the OLC apparently believed that partnerships are, by 
their nature, pass-through entities and must be disregarded.165 
 
 155. Foreign Gifts, supra note 148. 
 156. See id. at 158. 
 157. Non-Gov’t ACUS, supra note 147, at 118. 
 158. Id. at 115. 
 159. Id. at 117. 
 160. Id. at 118–19. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 119 (quoting letter received from ACUS). 
 163. Id. at 118. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 119. The OLC may have believed that in a services partnership, 
each partner ’s contributions to the entity compose a part of an amalgamated 
pool, such that whenever the partnership provides services to a client (like a 
foreign government), each partner is necessarily deemed to have performed ser-
vices for that client. See id. (describing partnerships as arrangements where 
persons join together and contribute, among other things, “labor” and “skill,” 
and establish a “community of interest or proportionate sharing of profits”). 
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It thus dismissed ACUS’s view, acknowledging that though the 
ACUS member “did not personally represent a foreign govern-
ment, and indeed had no personal contact” with one, the part-
nership would nonetheless “be a conduit.”166 
As between the two federal government agencies, ACUS got 
the analysis right. A payment from F to E to O should not be re-
characterized as a payment from F to O if no connection exists 
between them. To support its contrary (though internally super-
seding) view,167 the OLC relied on a partnership taxation case, 
of all things, but it erred in doing so.168 Under partnership taxa-
tion law, a payment to a partnership will generally be treated as 
such, and will not be characterized as a payment to individual 
partners.169 Additionally, the OLC’s approach contains a major 
loophole—a partnership can easily circumvent the opinion 
through adopting special allocation provisions.170 One suspects 
that private law firms responded to the OLC opinion by doing so. 
 
Whatever the merits of this theory in the abstract, it seems ill-suited to the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, which, as ACUS properly argued, focuses on an 
actual relationship between a U.S. Officer and a foreign government. Nonethe-
less, if the 1993 OLC opinion were followed, any U.S. Officer who personally 
provided services to a partnership would receive a prohibited emolument when-
ever her distributions of partnership income were allocable to amounts paid by 
foreign government clients. 
 166. Id. 
 167. OLC opinions, being internal interpretations provided between compo-
nents of the Executive Branch, do not carry the weight of statutes, regulations, 
or judicial decisions. See Cherichel v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1002, 1016 n.17 (8th Cir. 
2010) (noting that “OLC opinions are generally binding on the Executive 
branch” and not on the courts). Nonetheless, one gets the impression that the 
OLC does not hastily abandon its prior opinions, even when those opinions are 
issued under a previous administration. See Gary J. Edles, Service on Federal 
Advisory Committees: A Case Study of OLC’s Little-Known Emoluments Clause 
Jurisprudence, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (“OLC opinions are generally re-
garded as binding throughout the executive branch.”); Nelson Lund, Rational 
Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 489 (1993) (“It is 
true that opinions of the Attorney General (and now OLC) are generally treated 
as binding throughout the executive department.”). 
 168. See Non-Gov’t ACUS, supra note 147, at 119 (citing Commissioner v. 
Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946)). 
 169. See 26 U.S.C. § 703 (2012) (generally establishing a default approach 
under which income received by a partnership will be characterized at the part-
nership level). 
 170. Suppose that a U.S. Officer is a fifty-percent partner in a two-member 
partnership, and the partnership expects to earn one-hundred dollars of income 
from foreign governments and nine-hundred dollars from other sources. Rather 
than allocate profits on a pro rata basis, the partnership agreement could spec-
ify that the U.S. Officer will enjoy a one-hundred dollars priority allocation of 
income from nongovernment sources, and the other partner will enjoy a one-
hundred dollar priority allocation of income from foreign government sources. 
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The OLC, under the Bush and Obama Administrations, re-
pudiated the 1982 and 1993 opinions for defining U.S. Officers 
too broadly, so their precedential value remains unclear.171 How-
ever, if we assume that the OLC will follow the portions of those 
opinions that have not been repudiated, we can boil down its ap-
proach to one basic principle and one bright-line rule. Under the 
OLC’s basic principle, if F pays compensation to E for the perfor-
mance of services but those services are, in a substantial sense, 
provided by O, then E will be disregarded and will be treated as 
a mere conduit for that payment. And under the bright-line rule, 
when E is a partnership for which O, as a partner, provides ser-
vices, then E will be treated as a conduit for any distributions O 
receives that are attributable to foreign government clients, even 
if O does not personally provide services to them.172 This reflects 
a broader approach than the Comptroller General’s, which fo-
cuses heavily on the presence or absence of a de facto employer-
employee relationship between F and O.173 
The tests employed by the OLC and the Comptroller Gen-
eral each suffer from conceptual problems, and this Article thus 
proposes a different test, which pays proper respect to the For-
eign Emoluments Clause. Under the proposed business entity 
 
If this allocation method were respected for purposes of constitutional analysis, 
the U.S. Officer would not have received income from a foreign government 
through his distributive share of partner income. 
 171. See President’s Council, supra note 20 (stating that “confusion” 
stemmed from the 1982 abandonment of the “longstanding position that an ‘Of-
fice of Profit or Trust’ under the [Foreign] Emoluments Clause was synonymous 
with an ‘officer of the United States’ under the Appointments Clause”); Applica-
bility of the Emoluments Clause to Nongovernmental Members of ACUS, 34 Op. 
O.L.C. 1, 8 (2010) (“[W]e do not believe ACUS’s status as a statutorily created 
entity . . . provides sufficient ground to compel the application of the [Foreign] 
Emoluments Clause . . . even assuming that the Clause may apply in some in-
stances to persons who do not hold an office under the Appointments Clause.”); 
see also id. at 1 n.2 (refusing to either endorse or disclaim any of the opinions 
expressed in the 1993 OLC Opinion, other than issues related to the application 
of the Foreign Emoluments Clause to nongovernmental members of ACUS). On 
the precedential effect of OLC opinions, see generally Trevor W. Morrison, Stare 
Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010). 
 172. Whether and how the 1993 OLC ruling extends to other business enti-
ties reflects a source of uncertainty. See Jeffrey Green, Application of the Emol-
uments Clause to Department of Defense Civilian Employees and Military Per-
sonnel, 2013 ARMY LAW., no. 5, 2013, at 15, 17 (describing how an office within 
the Department of Defense “believes that this same rationale [in the 1993 OLC 
ruling] applies to distributions from limited liability corporations, although this 
view has not been officially sanctioned by the Department of Justice”). 
 173. In a footnote, the OLC has suggested that its approach to corporations, 
at least, follows that of the Comptroller General. See Non-Gov’t ACUS, supra 
note 147, at 118 n.4. 
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test, a payment from F to E to O will be treated as a payment 
from F to O when 
1. the foreign government, in a substantial sense, ne-
gotiates for the services of the U.S. Officer; 
2. the U.S. Officer performs those services; and 
3. the U.S. Officer enjoys control over the compensation 
paid by the foreign government to the interposed en-
tity. 
Unlike the OLC’s and Comptroller General’s tests, the proposed 
business entity test connects itself to the key elements of the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause. The OLC opinions focus heavily on 
whether a payment comes from a foreign government,174 but a 
payment from a foreign government, by itself, does not trigger 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause. The payment itself must sat-
isfy the definition of emolument (parts one and two of the pro-
posed test), and the U.S. Officer must accept that emolument 
(part three). The Comptroller General focuses heavily on factors 
related to employer-employee relationships, but emoluments in-
clude compensation for any services personally provided, not just 
those provided in the capacity of an employee. 
The proposed business entity test would catch those covered 
by the Comptroller General’s test and then some. If a foreign 
government enjoys control over the performance and manner of 
a U.S. Officer’s work, the first two parts of the test, at least, 
should be satisfied easily. But even when that control is not pre-
sent, the proposed business entity test recognizes that emolu-
ments generally relate to the provision of services, and it applies 
 
 174. To be fair to OLC, though the 1982 Opinion was largely framed in terms 
of whether a payment was from a foreign government, its substantive analysis 
adopted a different approach, and looked to the qualifications of the U.S. Officer 
and his preexisting relationship with Mexico. That is, to determine whether the 
U.S. Officer received a payment from a foreign government, the OLC did not 
look literally at the source of the payment, but rather examined the connection 
between the foreign government and the U.S. Officer. However, the 1993 Opin-
ion focused heavily on the from issue and casually concluded that services per-
formed by a partner for a partnership should be deemed to have been performed 
for all of the partnership’s clients. If the 1993 Opinion were extended beyond 
partnership distributions to corporate distributions, and beyond circumstances 
where U.S. Officers personally provide services to an entity, then U.S. Officers 
who passively hold stock in publicly traded corporations would violate the Con-
stitution whenever those corporations engaged in transactions with foreign gov-
ernments. After all, the gains from those transactions would be reflected in a 
corporation’s earnings and profits, and distributions drawn from those earnings 
and profits, paid to a U.S. Officer, would be from a foreign government. 
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the Foreign Emoluments Clause when, for example, the U.S. Of-
ficer provides services in a capacity more closely resembling that 
of an independent contractor. 
Regarding the proposed business entity test and the OLC’s 
test, the conclusion reached in the 1982 opinion would be un-
changed. The foreign government there, in a substantial sense, 
specifically negotiated for the services of the U.S. Officer, and 
the U.S. Officer provided those services.175 And his acceptance of 
his salary, traced to the payment provided by the foreign govern-
ment to the consulting firm, reflected the U.S. Officer’s ac-
ceptance of an emolument. 
But the OLC’s opinion on the ACUS member would come out 
differently. No connection existed between the foreign govern-
ment and the ACUS member, and the member provided no ser-
vices to it at all.176 Thus, there was no emolument. A portion of 
his partnership distribution may have been from a foreign gov-
ernment, but that element alone does not trigger the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. 
The proposed business entity test will also lead to different 
conclusions in other contexts. Consider, for example, a hypothet-
ical U.S. Officer who, prior to taking office, wrote a book and con-
tinues to receive a five percent royalty from the publisher for 
each book sold. During the U.S. Officer’s period of public service, 
foreign governments purchase copies of the book and the pub-
lisher passes on royalty payments to him. 
If the OLC’s conduit approach applies here, the U.S. Officer 
will have received a prohibited emolument.177 Given the fixed 
royalty figure, it will be easy to apply a conduit analysis and 
show that the U.S. Officer received a payment from a foreign 
government. And though no connection exists between the for-
eign government and the U.S. Officer, that fact does not control 
under the OLC’s approach. On these hypothetical facts, based 
 
 175. By referring to the provision of services generally, the proposed busi-
ness entity test assumes a foreign orientation towards emoluments. That is, as 
discussed in Part I.C, it assumes that compensation for the performance of any 
services by a U.S. Officer for a foreign government can qualify as an emolument. 
However, if one adopts a U.S. orientation, then the first two prongs must be 
narrowed such that the negotiated services bear a material relationship to the 
services provided by the U.S. Officer in her official capacity. In the 1982 OLC 
Opinion, this standard would be satisfied, given the similarity of the work per-
formed for the NRC and Mexican government. 
 176. Non-Gov’t ACUS, supra note 147, at 118. 
 177. No problem would arise under the Comptroller General’s test, given the 
absence of anything resembling an employer-employee relationship. 
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loosely on former President Barack Obama’s book royalties, the 
U.S. Officer will have violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
unless Congress consents to the receipt of his royalty payments. 
And for book purchases made by state and federal governments, 
no congressional consent can save him from constitutional viola-
tions under the Domestic Emoluments Clause.178 
But by tying the analysis to the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause’s language, parts one and two of the proposed business 
entity test spare the U.S. Officer from constitutional violations. 
Because the foreign government did not contract for personal 
services from the U.S. Officer—it simply purchased books—no 
emolument arises. Stated another way, the U.S. Officer may 
have accepted a payment from a foreign government, but be-
cause that payment does not reflect compensation for services 
provided to that government, he has not accepted an emolument 
within the meaning of the Constitution. 
Regarding part three of the proposed business entity test, it 
will apply easily whenever the foreign government’s payment to 
the entity is immediately transferred to the U.S. Officer in the 
form of a salary, dividend, royalty, or similar payment. In these 
circumstances, the U.S. Officer will have “accept[ed]” an emolu-
ment, as required by the Foreign Emoluments Clause. However, 
the absence of a transfer to the U.S. Officer should not neces-
sarily end the analysis. If the U.S. Officer wholly owns the inter-
posed entity, for example, she will be able to compel distribution 
of the foreign government’s payment at her will, and the entity’s 
acceptance of that payment may fairly be treated as an ac-
ceptance by the U.S. Officer herself. Part three of the proposed 
test consequently looks at whether the U.S. Officer enjoys con-
trol over the payment, rather than only at physical receipt. 
It would be impossible to prescribe a detailed test to cover 
the innumerable types of economic arrangements that may exist 
between a U.S. Officer and a business entity. However, unlike 
the OLC’s and the Comptroller General’s tests, the proposed 
business entity test carefully obeys the language of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. It thus sets forth superior standards to gov-
ern the analysis, even though difficult questions will inevitably 
arise as one applies it to complex facts. 
 
 178. See, e.g., David Jackson, State Dept. Buys $70K of Obama Books, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 26, 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/ 
2011/10/state-dept-buys-70k-of-obama-books/1#.Wb7EwMiGNPa. 
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III.  THE FOREIGN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE UNDER 
PRESIDENT TRUMP   
The analysis thus far has examined legal questions related 
to the Foreign Emoluments Clause under a general approach. 
This Part specifically focuses on President Trump. It considers 
to what extent his business activities may establish violations of 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 
Recall that, as described in Part I.B, an emolument refers to 
the compensation received from the performance of services for 
a foreign government. Emoluments do not broadly include any 
payment from a foreign government, nor do they broadly include 
any payment that would not be received but for one’s office or 
employment. For example, the judge displaced by the Nazis 
would not have received a fixed settlement payment from Ger-
many but for his official position, yet that payment, according to 
the OLC and the Comptroller General, was not an emolument.179 
Ronald Reagan would not have received his retirement benefits 
from California but for his service as Governor, yet those bene-
fits, according to the OLC, were not an emolument.180 And a pen-
sion payment to a retired Justice would not be paid but for his 
service on the Supreme Court,181 yet the Senate did not charac-
terize pension payments as emoluments.182 
Also, recall that under the foreign-focused approach de-
scribed in Part I.C, compensation for any services personally pro-
vided by a U.S. Officer to a foreign government will qualify as an 
emolument. But solely for the sake of being comprehensive, this 
Part will also analyze the facts using a narrower, U.S.-focused 
approach, under which only compensation for services that bear 
 
 179. See Rankin Memo, supra note 10, at 7; Acceptance of Annuity Payments 
Made by the German Gov’t, 34 Comp. Gen. 331, 331 (1955). 
 180. See President Reagan, supra note 86, at 192. 
 181. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text. 
 182. Arguably, once an employment or official relationship has been estab-
lished, any payments made but for that relationship should be treated as emol-
uments. Definitions regarding emoluments frequently refer to the compensa-
tion that “results from” or is “derived from” one’s employment or office, and 
phrases like that, depending on the context, may trigger simple but-for analysis. 
See Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 887–88 (2014) (interpreting 
phrases like “results from” as requiring, at a minimum, but-for causality, 
though sometimes more may be required). If this alternative interpretive path 
were followed, then the existence of an employment or official relationship with 
a foreign government would still be a condition to the finding of any emolu-
ments, but once that condition were satisfied, all payments that would not have 
been received but for that relationship, such as pensions, would qualify as emol-
uments. 
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a connection to a U.S. Officer’s official government duties quali-
fies as an emolument. 
A. PAYMENTS TO PRESIDENT TRUMP PERSONALLY 
For transactions involving President Trump personally, the 
analysis should be relatively straightforward. Under an office-
related, U.S.-focused definition of emoluments, any payment 
from a foreign government directly to President Trump in ex-
change for services related to his official government duties 
should qualify as an emolument under the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause.183 For example, if a foreign government paid President 
Trump a fifty thousand dollar fee to consult on immigration pol-
icy, that compensation would qualify as an emolument, because 
President Trump will have entered into a services relationship 
with a foreign government and the services provided would re-
late to one of his official presidential duties (immigration policy). 
Under a foreign-focused approach, emoluments would also 
generally arise even if President Trump performed services un-
related to his official U.S. position. For example, suppose a for-
eign government hired President Trump to guest host a reality 
TV show. The related compensation (emolument) would stem 
from an employment relationship with a foreign government, 
and so the Foreign Emoluments Clause would apply. 
One might argue that the compensation received in the 
game show hypothetical would be unconstitutional even under 
the more restrictive, U.S.-focused approach. That is, though we 
are dealing with hypothetical facts, it seems probable that a for-
eign government would have hired Donald Trump, the President 
of the United States, not Donald Trump, the private citizen. 
Viewed this way, the foreign government’s payment would relate 
to the office of the President and would qualify as an emolument. 
We can even go further and say that, given the responsibilities 
assigned under Article II, any services personally provided by 
the President are presumptively made in an official capacity, 
particularly when interacting with foreign governments.184 
 
 183. See supra Part I.B. 
 184. The Supreme Court has recognized that the President can act in a pri-
vate capacity and may even be subject to lawsuits for offenses committed in that 
capacity. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 696 (1997) (“With respect to acts 
taken in his ‘public character ’—that is, official acts—the President may be dis-
ciplined principally by impeachment, not by private lawsuits for damages. But 
he is otherwise subject to the laws for his purely private acts.”). However, the 
Constitution contemplates an active role for the President in foreign affairs. See 
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Nonetheless, though we may have to imagine unusual facts, it is 
possible that a U.S.-focused approach will narrow the scope of 
foreign government compensation reached by the Foreign Emol-
uments Clause. 
 
B. PAYMENTS TO THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION  
President Trump has promised to separate himself from his 
business through the implementation of a complex independent 
trust arrangement.185 Under the arrangement, President Trump 
will retain his ownership interests in the Trump Organization, 
but will not play an operational or managerial role.186 Also, he 
has promised not to communicate about business matters with 
his sons who, along with others, will manage the organization.187 
Last, he has promised to donate any profits from some foreign 
government transactions to the United States Treasury.188 
If this plan effectively insulates the President from the 
Trump Organization (a point of some debate),189 it is unlikely 
that any emolument will arise, though prohibited foreign gifts or 
bribes might. Because President Trump will perform no services 
for a foreign government through the Trump Organization, there 
can be, by definition, no office-related compensation. Even if an 
emolument arises, President Trump has promised to turn over 
at least some profits from foreign government transactions, such 
that those emoluments would not be accepted.190 
 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (making the President commander-in-chief of the mili-
tary, and granting the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors). Thus, 
when a President performs services for a foreign government, we can generally 
presume that he is acting in his official capacity, although this necessarily pre-
sents a factual question. 
 185. See MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, WHITE PAPER: CONFLICTS OF IN-
TEREST AND THE PRESIDENT 2 (Jan. 11, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/3280261/MLB-White-Paper-1-10-Pm.pdf (detailing President 
Trump’s plan to manage conflicts of interest with his business holdings). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 6. 
 189. See, e.g., Milan Markovic, The President-Elect’s Conflicts Plan, LEGAL 
ETHICS F. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2017/01/the 
-president-elects-conflicts-plan.html (expressing some “strong misgivings” 
about the plan’s effectiveness in addressing conflicts of interest). 
 190. See MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, supra note 185, at 6 (announcing 
that President Trump will “donate all profits from foreign governments’ patron-
age of his hotels and similar businesses during his presidential term to the U.S. 
Treasury”). 
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But, for the sake of completing the analysis, and to provide 
guidance to future presidents and other U.S. Officers, the rest of 
this Part will assume that the independent trust arrangement 
does not apply. Naturally, this counterfactual approach carries 
significant limitations. At most, this Article can offer a general 
analytical framework for anyone who must determine the legal 
consequences if the President’s independent trust arrangement 
breaks down or if it otherwise fails to insulate the President from 
the Trump Organization. 
1. Emoluments Under the Proposed Business Entity Test 
Though the Trump Organization bears the President’s 
name, it stands as a collection of entities legally separate from 
him. Public filings show that the Trump Organization comprises 
around 500 business entities of various forms (including part-
nerships, limited liability companies, and corporations), many of 
which are wholly-owned, directly or indirectly, by President 
Trump.191 While it is most commonly associated with real estate 
ventures, the Trump Organization operates in numerous indus-
tries.192 
The Trump Organization maintains business relationships 
with various foreign governments,193 and these relationships 
raise potential Foreign Emoluments Clause issues. For example, 
foreign government representatives may patronize Trump hotels 
or golf courses, foreign-government-owned banks may loan 
money to Trump Organization entities, and foreign municipali-
ties may pursue real estate projects with the Trump Organiza-
tion.194 In each of these circumstances, it is at least possible that 
 
 191. See generally DONALD TRUMP, EXECUTIVE BRANCH PERSONNEL PUBLIC 
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT (2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/2838696/Trump-2016-Financial-Disclosure.pdf. 
 192. See Donald Trump’s Many, Many Business Dealings in 1 Map, TIME 
(Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.time.com/4629308/donald-trump-business-deals 
-world-map (providing a list of potential conflicts President Trump may have in 
various countries). 
 193. See Megan Twohey et al., Inside the Trump Organization, the Company 
that Has Run Trump’s Big World, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2016/12/25/us/politics/trump-organization-business.html (dis-
cussing the argument that unless President Trump fully divests from his com-
pany and places someone independent of his family in control, he risks violating 
the Constitution by taking payments from a foreign government). 
 194. Under OLC guidance, an instrumentality of a foreign government, like 
a bank or university, is not necessarily treated as part of that government for 
purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Rather, where an instrumentality 
is sufficiently independent of the central foreign government, transactions with 
that instrumentality will not be covered by the clause. See President’s Receipt, 
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a payment or benefit directed to the Trump Organization may be 
treated as the acceptance of an emolument by President Trump. 
However, no emolument can arise for any payments made 
to the Trump Organization where President Trump does not per-
sonally perform any services for a foreign government. Under 
the first two parts of the proposed business entity test, and un-
der the legal authorities described in Part I, the payments can-
not qualify as emoluments because President Trump will have 
no office or employment relationship with the foreign govern-
ment, directly or indirectly. Even if the amounts paid by the for-
eign government greatly exceed the fair market value of goods 
or services provided, no emolument can arise, given the absence 
of the requisite relationship. Instead, any Foreign Emoluments 
Clause analysis would have to focus on whether the excess pay-
ments reflected prohibited gifts.195 If the focus moves beyond the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, then excess payments could poten-
tially qualify as impeachable bribes,196 depending on the facts. 
If President Trump, through the Trump Organization, per-
sonally provides services to a foreign government by, for exam-
ple, agreeing to speak at a hotel event in exchange for a fee, an 
emolument would almost certainly arise under the first two 
prongs of the proposed business entity test. Under the authori-
ties described in Part I.C, it would not matter whether the ser-
vices provided related to his Presidency—all payments related 
 
supra note 10. Whether any particular transaction between the Trump Organi-
zation and a foreign-government instrumentality is potentially covered by the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause will necessarily depend on the facts. 
 195. Ordinarily, a gift contemplates a transfer made without any considera-
tion received in exchange. See Gift, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANS-
FERS § 6.1(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“To make a gift of property, the donor must 
transfer an ownership interest to the donee without consideration and with don-
ative intent.”). Where, however, one person nominally purchases, with donative 
intent, an item from another person for an amount greatly exceeding its fair 
market value, it seems appropriate to treat the excess payment as a gift, since 
that portion is a transfer made without consideration. There are no such au-
thorities applying this method of analysis in the context of the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause, though one sees it in other contexts. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.1015-
4(a) (2017) (describing tax consequences for a transfer of property that is “in 
part a sale and in part a gift”). 
 196. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil 
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, 
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”); 
see also Bribery, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The corrupt pay-
ment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official action.”); see generally 
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 41–45 (1979) (discussing the original com-
mon law definition of bribery and the evolution of the term). 
 684 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:639 
 
to services personally provided would be emoluments. However, 
if one adopted a U.S.-focused approach, the foreign government’s 
payments would qualify as prohibited emoluments only if the 
services related to the President’s official duties. 
Of course, it may be difficult to determine whether President 
Trump has provided services to a foreign government. A foreign 
government might, for example, patronize the Trump Organiza-
tion without explicitly negotiating, in writing, for a consultation 
with him. The parties might instead have an unwritten agree-
ment ensuring that services will be provided discreetly. 
In these circumstances, determining whether the foreign 
government paid a market rate for any goods or services pro-
vided by the Trump Organization should guide the analysis. If a 
market rate is paid, then no inference arises that the payment 
relates to the provision of services by President Trump. If, how-
ever, an above-market rate is paid, that would provide a sign 
that the foreign government has purchased something beyond 
goods and services from the Trump Organization.  
To illustrate, consider room reservations made at the Trump 
Hotel in Washington, D.C. Many such rooms are likely reserved 
each day by tourists and other private persons at prevailing mar-
ket rates. Though the Trump Organization may profit on each 
room reservation, the profit relates to the operation of a lodging 
business, not to the provision of services by the President. Pre-
sumably, the vast majority of persons who reserve rooms will 
never see or interact with the President.  
The analysis should not change if a foreign diplomat, using 
his respective government’s funds, reserves a room on the same 
terms as tourists or other private persons. That is, if the diplo-
mat pays the exact same price as a tourist and receives the exact 
same service in return, no part of his purchase price would relate 
to services provided by President Trump. He might subjectively 
hope that the President will view his patronage favorably, but 
subjective wishes cannot change the economic character of a 
transaction. If a homeowner hires one person to mow his lawn, 
then, no matter how fervently he believes otherwise, he has not 
hired that person or a second person to give him a haircut. In the 
same way, a payment to the Trump Hotel for lodging services or 
to the hotel restaurant for a meal cannot, through subjective in-
tentions alone, become a payment to the President in exchange 
for his personal services.197  
 
 197. Subjective feelings alone cannot transfer the payment into a gift, either. 
A gift contemplates a transfer that is not made in exchange for consideration. 
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Of course, when a foreign diplomat stays at the Trump Ho-
tel, the President may enjoy an economic benefit from the room 
reservation. And some foreign diplomats might not stay at the 
Trump Hotel but for the fact that Donald Trump is President. 
However, that alone is not enough to establish a Foreign Emol-
uments Clause violation.198 Payments to a U.S. Officer from a 
foreign government must stem from an office or employment re-
lationship with that government to qualify as an emolument. If 
President Trump automatically accords special treatment to for-
eign government patrons of the Trump Organization, without 
entering into an employment relationship with them, that would 
raise serious ethical questions, but it would not raise questions 
under the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 
Suspicions may be properly raised if a diplomat pays a rate 
higher than that offered to an ordinary visitor. In these circum-
stances, we cannot trace the amount paid to a good or service 
provided by the Trump Organization. Thus, an inference arises 
that the foreign government paid for something else. That some-
thing else may very well be services provided by President 
Trump, and his acceptance of the compensation would, absent 
congressional consent, violate the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 
Even if President Trump provided no services, an above-market 
payment raises the possibility that an unconstitutional gift or 
bribe has been offered and accepted.  
Unfortunately, this market-rate framework can only take us 
so far. Given the nature of the Trump Organization’s business, 
it may undertake unique transactions with foreign governments 
involving the provision of licenses, trademarks, copyrights, or 
other intangible benefits. In these circumstances, it may be dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to apply a market-rate approach, given 
the absence of any comparable transactions. That is, we can con-
clude that a foreign government provides no office-related com-
pensation when it pays the same price as a member of the public 
for a hotel stay, but a fair market value analysis does not trans-
late very well to transactions involving intangible government 
benefits. 
 
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 6.1 cmt. b (“The relevant criterion [for a gift] is intent to transfer an ownership 
interest gratuitously, as opposed to engaging in an exchange transaction or 
making an involuntary transfer.”). If a payment is made to another person in 
exchange for services, then the payment is classified as compensation. See Com-
pensation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Remuneration and other 
benefits received in return for services rendered.”). 
 198. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text. 
 686 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:639 
 
However, this problem may be moot because many intangi-
ble government benefits provided to business entities might not 
qualify as emoluments at all, given their restrictions on enjoy-
ment. For example, an insurance license issued to a corporation 
would not ordinarily authorize any U.S. Officer-shareholders to 
offer insurance in the state. This makes the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause analysis here different from the situations exam-
ined in Part II, where a cash payment from a foreign government 
flowed through an entity and into a U.S. Officer’s hands. If a 
benefit exists solely with the entity and cannot be personally en-
joyed by a U.S. Officer, then it might be impossible for an emol-
ument to arise. 
Of course, intangible government benefits can create indi-
rect benefits for U.S. Officers. For example, President Trump 
may enjoy an increase in wealth when a foreign government 
grants a liquor license to a Trump Organization entity, thereby 
facilitating its conduct of a hospitality business. If President 
Trump agreed to provide U.S. government favors in exchange for 
that license, ethical or even bribery questions may arise.199 But 
this potentially troubling behavior would be an awkward matter 
for the Foreign Emoluments Clause to address, especially if the 
foreign government license could not be transferred. And broadly 
treating intangible government benefits provided to entities as 
emoluments would surely imply that many U.S. Officers have 
violated the Constitution’s emoluments clauses by, for example, 
personally enjoying U.S. and foreign government copyright pro-
tections in their published works.200 
 
 199. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (providing civil and criminal penalties 
for public officials who accept a bribe); 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(j) (2017) (implying 
that the anti-bribery statute applies to the President). Whether the federal anti-
bribery statute extends to the President remains unclear, though the OLC has 
concluded that it does. See Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Ap-
pointments of Fed. Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. 350, 357 n.11 (1995). The Constitution 
contemplates that bribery will establish grounds for impeachment. See U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 200. For example, before and during his period of public service, President 
Obama enjoyed U.S. and foreign copyright protection for his written works, and 
earned royalties from those works. See Michael Galvis, Barack Obama’s Net 
Worth on His 55th Birthday, MONEY (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.time.com/ 
money/4439729/barack-obama-net-worth-55th-birthday (describing President 
Obama’s prior earnings and noting his reporting of royalty income through 
2015). If emoluments include all intangible government benefits, then the ben-
efits associated with President Obama’s continued U.S. copyright protection (or 
copyright renewals) would trigger violations of the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause. See, e.g., BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RE-
CLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM (Broadway Books 2007) (2006) (under U.S. 
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In any event, if intangible government benefits provided to 
an entity can qualify as emoluments to a U.S. Officer, then the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause analysis would turn on whether 
President Trump provided services to the foreign government as 
an officer or employee of that government. If he did so, then, un-
der parts one and two of the proposed business entity test, one 
would need to further examine whether any connection exists 
between the provision of the intangible government benefit and 
the services performed. If a connection exists, an emolument 
likely arises.  
2. Acceptance of Emoluments 
Even if a foreign government provides office-related com-
pensation to President Trump through the Trump Organization, 
no constitutional problem arises unless President Trump accepts 
the emolument.201 Under part three of the proposed business en-
tity test, physical acceptance is not required.202 Rather, ac-
ceptance can occur by enjoying control over the payment. This 
approach likely reaches more potential emoluments than does 
the Comptroller General’s approach or the OLC’s approach, 
which seem limited to actual transfers, whether via salary pay-
ments or entity distributions.  
Once again, it is impossible to meaningfully apply the pro-
posed business entity test without knowing the specific details 
of the Trump Organization entities. Where President Trump 
wholly owns an entity, whether directly or indirectly, we can 
probably attribute the entity’s receipt of a payment to President 
Trump himself. Much like an amount paid to his personal bank 
account, President Trump would enjoy control over the funds 
and may face few impediments to its distribution, whether in the 
form of a dividend, salary, royalty, or other payment. 
 
copyright, registered by Barack Obama in 2006). Continued copyright protec-
tion or renewals under foreign law would trigger violations of the Foreign Emol-
uments Clause. See, e.g., BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS 
ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM (Canongate Books 2008) (2006) (under 
U.K. copyright, registered by Barack Obama in 2006). 
 201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 202. The OLC has not addressed a circumstance where a U.S. Officer does 
not physically accept an emolument paid to an entity. Rather, its analysis has 
involved circumstances where the U.S. Officer would draw a salary or receive a 
distribution from an entity. It is thus unclear whether the OLC considers phys-
ical acceptance a condition to apply the Foreign Emoluments Clause. If it does, 
then, under the OLC’s test, no emolument would arise in connection with Pres-
ident Trump’s holdings in the Trump Organization, absent a distribution or 
payment. 
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If President Trump does not control an entity because he 
holds only a minority stake in it, it may be difficult to determine 
whether he retains control over a foreign government payment 
made to the entity. However, this sort of factual analysis may be 
unnecessary. If President Trump does not control an entity, it 
seems unlikely that a foreign government would make an office-
related payment to it in the first place. Why would a foreign gov-
ernment transfer money to an entity if the President cannot get 
his hands on the funds, and why would the President agree to a 
compensation arrangement of this sort? Given the unlikelihood 
of compensation arrangements involving entities in which Pres-
ident Trump owns only a minority interest, interpretive ambigu-
ities related to acceptance and control for that class of entities 
might be avoidable.203 
If President Trump wholly owns an entity but does not con-
trol that entity because of the independent trust arrangement, 
perplexing questions may arise. In these circumstances, foreign 
governments might be motivated to make above-market pay-
ments to the entity, notwithstanding the trust arrangement. 
That is, a trustee might not tell President Trump about any 
above-market payments, but foreign governments themselves 
might. If President Trump becomes aware of a payment and per-
forms services for the foreign government in exchange for that 
payment, then President Trump will have accepted an emolu-
ment. Even if no services were provided, the above-market pay-
ment would probably qualify as a prohibited gift or maybe even 
an impeachable bribe, if the payment were known and accepted 
by President Trump. 
In some circumstances, President Trump may receive office-
related payments but, to avoid the appearance of any impropri-
eties, turn them over to the Treasury. One might argue that the 
President will have necessarily accepted a prohibited emolu-
ment, despite the subsequent transfer. But this interpretation 
would not comport with past practice, where U.S. Officers phys-
ically received foreign gifts and then, consistent with their con-
stitutional obligations, sought congressional direction regarding 
 
 203. Foreign Gifts, supra note 147, involved office-related compensation 
transferred to a non-shareholder of an entity. Thus, it is at least possible that a 
minority shareholder or a mere employee may receive office-related compensa-
tion from a foreign government. However, in those cases, there should be addi-
tional available facts, such as actual payments or distributions, that would fa-
cilitate the analysis. 
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their acceptance or disposal.204 And general principles of com-
mon law embrace “disclaimers” of received property.205 Given 
this background, the receipt of an emolument by the President, 
later transferred to the U.S. Treasury, should not be treated as 
the prohibited acceptance of an emolument, though authorities 
on this issue remain sparse.206 
C. A SLIGHT DETOUR: THE DOMESTIC EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE 
Though this Article has focused on the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, much of its analysis should extend to the Domestic Emol-
uments Clause. The two clauses share similar purposes and use 
similar phrasing, at least in terms of emoluments. Thus, for 
many of the reasons already discussed, the Domestic Emolu-
ments Clause embraces office-related compensation and does not 
prohibit the receipt of all imaginable payments or benefits from 
the state or federal governments. 
 
 204. When a U.S. Officer receives a prohibited gift from a foreign govern-
ment and Congress withholds its consent to its acceptance, Congress does not 
order the return or destruction of the gift. Rather, the gift must be deposited 
with the U.S. Treasury. See 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“[A] tangible gift 
of more than minimal value is deemed to have been accepted on behalf of the 
United States and, upon acceptance, shall become the property of the United 
States.”); see also Teachout, supra note 16, at 36, 42 (regarding the receipt of 
snuffboxes by Arthur Lee and Benjamin Franklin, “they clearly thought it sat-
isfied the clause [under the Articles] to present the gift to Congress, and if Con-
gress approved, they (and Congress) believed they could keep it without violat-
ing the rule. . . . According to John Quincy Adams, he asked friends in Holland 
how they interpreted the clause [under the Articles], and was told that the ab-
solute language of the clause merely forbade the unilateral acceptance of gifts; 
they could be kept if the government granted permission.”); id. at 42 (detailing 
Congressional involvement and consent when Presidents Van Buren and Tyler 
received gifts from a foreign nation); Tillman, Public Meaning, supra note 23, 
at 190 (“Andrew Jackson received a gold medal from the South American revo-
lutionary Simón Bolívar, President of Columbia. In 1830, Jackson submitted it 
to congressional control.”). The principle underlying this approach, under which 
received gifts belong to the United States as a whole, can plausibly extend to 
emoluments. See Kammerer, B-193562, 1979 WL 11736 at *1 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 
4, 1979) (“[E]moluments received by [the U.S. Officer] are received on behalf of 
the United States.”). Thus, if President Trump receives an emolument and 
passes it along to the Treasury, he likely has not violated the Constitution, given 
the lack of the required acceptance. 
 205. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 6.1(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (describing a donee’s right to disclaim a gift). 
 206. See, e.g., Irish Citizenship, supra note 39, at 281 n.3 (surveying some 
historical practices and concluding that “[a]s a legal matter, the consent of Con-
gress can be obtained either in advance or following receipt of anything covered 
by the Foreign Emoluments Clause”). 
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However, the relevant office or employment relationship un-
der the two clauses should be different. The Domestic Emolu-
ments Clause concerns itself with the compensation the Presi-
dent will receive for services provided in his official position with 
the United States.207 Thus, in testing whether a payment is an 
emolument, the relevant question is whether the payment re-
lates to the services the President provides in his capacity as 
such. This orientation differs from the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, which looks to whether a U.S. Officer receives compen-
sation for services provided in a separate official or employment 
relationship with another government (that is, a foreign govern-
ment).208 
Unfortunately, the OLC missed this distinction when it ap-
plied the Domestic Emoluments Clause to President Reagan’s 
retirement benefits. Its opinion, discussed earlier, examined the 
connection the retirement benefits had with Reagan’s service as 
California Governor.209 The OLC should have examined whether 
those benefits had any connection to the services Reagan pro-
vided to the U.S. federal government as President. 
When the Comptroller General addressed this issue, he con-
firmed the OLC’s conclusion but followed the proper analytical 
path. Under his approach, emoluments could not refer to bene-
fits that had “no connection, either direct or indirect, with the 
Presidency.”210 And under this line of analysis, no constitutional 
problem arose, given that Reagan earned his retirement benefits 
prior to his assumption of the Presidency, and that he received 
them on the same terms as any other similarly situated Califor-
nia public servant.211 
 
 207. U.S. CONST. art. II § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for his Services, a Compensation . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Griffin 
v. United States, 935 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that President Nixon’s 
presidential papers were private property, not “transferred to him by the gov-
ernment as compensation for his service in office,” and the “proceeds derived 
from the sale of Mr. Nixon’s presidential papers do not constitute an emolu-
ment”). 
 208. See supra Part I.C. 
 209. See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
 210. Letter from Milton J. Socolar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller 
Gen., to George Mitchell, U.S. Senate (Jan. 18, 1983), https://www.gao.gov/ 
products/423723#mt=e-report. 
 211. Id. The Comptroller General noted that the mere fact that the right to 
payments arose prior to taking office would not preclude their classification as 
emoluments, if the payments were connected to the Presidency. See id. at n.3 
(“We should point out, however, that we would view as prohibited under [the 
Domestic Emoluments Clause] any type of additional benefit, contractual or 
otherwise, received by the President from a state or Federal body as having been 
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Like the Foreign Emoluments Clause, the Domestic Emolu-
ments Clause presents ambiguities as one attempts to apply it 
to complex facts. However, a full exploration of its nuances is 
best left for another day. For now, one can assume that an emol-
ument under the Domestic Emoluments Clause refers to only of-
fice-related compensation, not all payments or benefits provided 
by the federal or state governments. 
  CONCLUSION   
The various limitations on the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
may leave one wondering whether it has any teeth. Whether it 
applies to this country’s most important official, the President of 
the United States, remains unclear. And if Congress refuses to 
enforce the clause, it is doubtful that any private party would 
have standing to enforce it in court.212 
In his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States, Justice Joseph Story even questioned the fundamental 
premise of the clause. Though the Framers properly grounded 
the clause in a “just jealousy of foreign influence,” he wrote, 
whether it could “produce much effect . . . ha[d] been thought 
doubtful.”213 A patriot, Justice Story believed, “will not be likely 
to be seduced” by potential emoluments, while a “corrupt” U.S. 
Officer would not bother with “constitutional restrictions” in the 
first instance.214 
With those limitations in mind, maybe one should not be 
surprised by the relative obscurity of the Foreign Emoluments 
 
earned prior to his occupancy of the Office, yet made in anticipation of that 
event.”). 
 212. In some circumstances, the Comptroller General has attempted to give 
“substantial effect” to the Foreign Emoluments Clause by withholding the pay 
of a U.S. Officer who has received a prohibited emolument. See Retired Uni-
formed Servs. Members Receiving Comp. from Foreign Gov’ts, 58 Comp. Gen. 
487, 490–91 (1979). However, the Comptroller General acknowledges that the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause does not specify a remedy for any violation. See 
Breningstall, Dep’t of the Air Force, 53 Comp. Gen. 753, 758 (1974). The OLC 
has raised concerns with the soundness and legality of the Comptroller Gen-
eral’s approach, especially regarding the President, whose salary the Constitu-
tion protects against diminution. See President Reagan, supra note 86, at 193. 
If a U.S. Officer ’s salary or retirement benefit is withheld on account of an al-
leged constitutional violation, such that she has suffered a discrete injury, she 
would meet the basic elements required to establish standing. See Lujan v. Def. 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (to establish standing, a plaintiff must 
generally satisfy requirements related to particularized injuries, causation, and 
redressability). 
 213. 3 STORY, supra note 17. 
 214. Id. 
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Clause. Congress, after all, has legislatively addressed many po-
tential ethical conflicts faced by U.S. Officers.215 And political or 
reputational mechanisms impose an important check on those 
who may otherwise be tempted to betray their public duties. 
A President with ownership of a global business enterprise, 
however, may make one nervous about the efficacy of existing 
legal frameworks. The Constitution, whatever its many merits, 
was not designed to specifically address elected officials with 
worldwide business interests. As is often the case, the document 
must be applied to facts not envisioned by the Framers or the 
ratifying states. 
But these potential concerns should not be addressed 
through giving constitutional terms an impermissible interpre-
tation. Virtually every relevant legal authority establishes that 
emoluments under the Constitution refer to compensation re-
ceived in exchange for services provided as an officer or em-
ployee, not payments or benefits of any sort. Legitimate ques-
tions may arise when one confronts complex facts, but a 
president’s or U.S. Officer’s acceptance of a payment from a for-
eign government does not, by itself, establish a constitutional vi-
olation. Instead, the facts must be examined closely, to deter-
mine whether a foreign government has directly made payments 
to a U.S. Officer in exchange for personal services, or has indi-
rectly done so through above-market payments to a business 
controlled by him. 
As importantly, the rule of law requires that constitutional 
provisions apply neutrally, to all persons who come within their 
scope.216 But an expansive interpretation of the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause would inevitably justify the impeachment of many 
 
 215. See generally JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENTERING THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT: POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
WITH PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENTS AND AFFILIATIONS (2007) (providing an outline 
of issues, rules, regulations, and oversight tools for those conducting congres-
sional oversight to conflicts of interests of executive branch employees); JACK 
MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FINANCIAL ASSETS AND CONFLICT OF INTER-
EST REGULATION IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (2014). 
 216. To illustrate the rule of law problems, consider a simple example, where 
a statute criminalizes the importation of fruit, and numerous persons import 
tomatoes. It would violate the rule of law for a given court to hold that tomatoes 
were fruits for some criminal defendants but that they were vegetables for oth-
ers. See, e.g., Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (“Dis-
cretion is not whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps 
promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.”); 
Robert S. Summers, The Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1691, 1693 (1999) (emphasizing, among other things, that the rule of law con-
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future U.S. Officers and would stain those who have previously 
served our country with honor. The resulting state of affairs—
under which Congress could establish a constitutional violation 
for any U.S. Officer it disagreed with—may create risks far be-
yond those associated with a President who maintains extensive 
business interests. One should consider these consequences be-
fore rejecting the numerous legal authorities establishing an of-
fice-related definition of emoluments. 
 
templates that a form of law be interpreted uniformly); see also Clark v. Mar-
tinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005) (“[We decline to] establish within our jurispru-
dence, beyond the power of Congress to remedy, the dangerous principle that 
judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases.”). 
Returning to the Foreign Emoluments Clause, if one defines emoluments as 
reaching all payments from foreign governments, one cannot create case-by-
case exceptions for this rule based on the subjective characteristics of a given 
U.S. Officer. To comply with rule of law principles, exceptions would have to be 
incorporated into the definition itself, and that definition would then have to 
apply uniformly to all U.S. Officers. 
